A lot of great stuff this week online from a baseball stat and sabermetric perspective. I don’t want to take too much time building it up, so I will just get right into the details.

The Great Clutch Project

I mentioned this a few weeks ago, concerning Tom Tango asking fans to join him in a battle in the clutch debate where he will pit his “good” hitters against the fans’ choice for “clutch hitters” to see if there really is a way people can see and perceive clutch. The stats he is using are his Leverage Index scores and wOBA (weighted on base average), so if you are not familiar with those, read up on them. You can find the summary of the project here, and Fangraphs will be running the season tally here for 2008.

Never thought I would see a Ginger/Mary-Anne and clutch/non-clutch analogy used, but I guess nothing should surprise me anymore.

Hardball Times OF Arms

John Walsh of THT reveals his new defensive metric to measure OF arms, something that has always been missing and that is sorely needed in the defense discussion that has escalated in the past few years. You can search by year on their stats page here, and there is a lengthy description of the methodology at this link. The stats for the OF arms goes back to 2004.

Richard Justice’s war with the stat guys

Local sports writer for the Houston Chronicle has the stats world up in arms from his reaction to a post by Mitchel Lichtman on Justice’s blog piece this week about bunting and how it is always a bad idea. Apparently, Justice has long been a target of some bloggers for his inability to look past emotion and personal feelings and look at the numbers. And the blogosphere just can’t get enough of all of this. And all of this from a couple of sentences about how bunting is always bad in the situation with which the Astros were faced.

For the record, I fall somewhere in the middle of what Lichtman and what Keith Law propose (you need to read all the threads to understand where that is). A manager has to make a yes/no decision in that moment, but his job should be to be as prepared as he possibly can with all the available data that will help him make an educated decision. The ones that are too close to call? Well, that’s why a managers are paid the way they are.

Lineup Analysis

This is not a new tool by any means, but something I have been messing around with this week that I recommend. Baseball Musings hosts a page that has a Lineup Analyzer put together by Morong, Arneson, and Armburst that allows you to put in any nine players with their OBP and SLG and it will construct the ideal lineup based on those numbers, and their calculated comparison and analysis of the two.

Here is the page, use it on your favorite team for this year or any year.

I work at a place that often gets involved in the political arena, specifically policy recommendation and research, so times like these are often quite entertaining and quite busy. My past couple of weeks have been spent working on plans for various presidential candidates we have invited to come and also hosting an event for Senator John McCain ahead of the Texas Primary. While I am not using all of that as an excuse for the delay in writing, I am using it as segue into what I will discuss today.

You see, when you host an event for a presidential candidate, there are always questions from the guests or from the audience that they would like answered. Inevitably, the two questions always raised are “would you have done X differently if you were president at that time,” and “if you are president, what will happen when you are faced with X problem?”

The candidates are a little more comfortable with the first question because hindsight is always 20/20 and they can come up with a solution that most people would approve and state how much better their solution is than the one that was made. Conversely, they get a little bit more uneasy when it comes to the second question, there are no decisions that have already been made about the hypothetical problem, thus nothing to base their answer on. And who knows, maybe they will be faced with this same problem in office, do they stick with their answer even though it may not be the best one, or decide differently, and risk looking like a liar or a flip-flopper.

I think the same holds true for baseball. It is a bit easier to look back and plug in a different solution/player/strategy than to predict the course of action for a hypothetical game situation or how a season will play out.

And thus is the nature of projections - a lot is usually right and a lot is usually wrong. However, it’s much easier to look back, take numbers we know are facts, and plug in a few new variables to make educated guesses than it is to base future numbers on unknowns.

And with that we turn our attention to the two new aces of the National League: Johan Santana and Dan Haren of the Mets and Diamondbacks, respectively. Fortunately, for the purposes of this research, both of their new teams were involved in tight races towards the end of the season, with the D’backs turning out a lot better than the now-famous collapse by the Mets the last 17 games of 2007.

While we can’t know for sure how these pitchers will perform in 2008, can we at least try to plug them onto their teams last year and see what kind of difference they would have made? Would it have caused Arizona to miss the playoffs? Caused the Mets to make the playoffs? And what is the best way to find out?

Well, also fortunate for us, we know exactly who these two new pitchers will be replacing on their new teams. Haren will replace Livan Hernandez in the rotation (who left for the Twins), while Santana will replace Tom Glavine (now with the Braves). Otherwise, the rotations seem to be the same.

With a little tweaking, and some playing with the numbers, adjusting them from league to league, I think we can tell how Haren and Santana might have affected their new teams had they been pitching instead of Hernandez and Glavine. Comparatively, Haren had 34 starts to Hernandez’s 33, and Santana also started 33 to Glavine’s 34 - so we almost come out event there already.

Here is what I think we should do:

First, we will remove one perfectly average game from Haren’s line and add one perfectly average game to Santana’s so that they will also each reflect 33 or 34 starts (I want to leave in the best and worst games because those are what make a pitcher’s season and define his consistency. See Ron Shandler’s PQS scores for more on that topic).

Second, we will subtract all of the runs allowed by Hernandez and Glavine for their teams last year from the team’s runs allowed total. We will work with both earned and unearned runs here so that the defensive aspect stays constant - it is something pitchers can not control.

Third, we have to add back in to the teams’ runs allowed totals the number of runs allowed by Santana and Haren last year. This is where it gets a bit tricky and where we have to adjust for context. In 2007, the average ERA in the AL was 4.50. In the NL, it was 4.43. So, the AL was about 2% tougher for pitchers than the NL. Keeping unearned numbers the same, we can adjust Santana’s and Haren’s earned run totals by that 2% to get a sensible estimate of what each pitcher would have done in the NL.

We will then check each team’s actual 2007 won-loss record compared to their expected won-loss record using runs scored vs. runs allowed and the Pythagenpat formula: X = ((rs+ra)/g)^.285 for the exponent and then rs^X/rs^X + ra^X for winning percentage. It has been documented that Clay Davenport, who modified the original Pythagorean Theory for win/loss by Bill James believes this Pythagenpat method is an even further improvement, so we will use that one. We will see how many wins better or worse the two teams were in 2007.

Then using the new runs allowed totals and adding them back into their new teams’ 2007 numbers, we can plug these in for runs allowed, adjust for the number of games better or worse they were above the expected outcome, and see where each team would have ended their 2007 regular season. Would the Mets have held off the Phillies? Would the D’Backs have won the division outright? Won the Wild Card? Missed the playoffs?

Here’s the math, starting with Santana:

2007 Mets - 88-74 record - 804 runs scored, 750 runs allowed for Pythagenpat record of 86-76 - two games better than projected
Glavine accounts for 102 runs - subtract from 750 to get 648
Santana accounts for 88 real runs in 2007, 81 earned
Add three earned runs to Santana’s total (an average start for Johan) to make him equal to 34 starts
Santana now has 91 total runs, 84 of them earned
Take 2% away from 84, leaving him with 82 earned runs, 89 total runs
Add 89 back into the 648 left for runs allowed for 737
Pythagenpat forumla:
X = ((804+737)/162)^.285, X = 1.90
W% = 804^1.90/804^1.90 + 737^1.90, W% = .541
New Pythagenpat record: 88-74
New actual record, 2 games better: 90-72

So now the Mets hang on and beat the Phillies (89-73) by one game to represent the NL East in the playoffs. And the 17-game collapse is all but forgotten. Until they get swept by the D’Backs.

And now for Haren:

2007 Diamondbacks - 90-72 record - 712 runs scored, 732 runs allowed for Pythagenpat record of 79-83 - 11 games better than projected
Hernandez accounts for 116 runs - subtract from 732 to get 616
Haren accounts for 91 real runs in 2007, 76 earned
Subtract three earned runs to Haren’s total (an average start for Haren) to make him equal to 34 starts
Haren now has 88 total runs, 73 of them earned
Take 2% away from 73, leaving him with 72 earned runs, 87 total runs
Add 87 back into the 616 left for runs allowed for 703
Pythagenpat formula:
X = ((712+703)/162)^.285, X = 1.855
W% = 712^1.855/712^1.855 + 703^1.855, W% = .506
New Pythagenpat record: 82-80
New actual record, 11 games better: 93-69

The D’Backs had the best record in the NL to begin with, edging out the Rockies for the WC and beating Philadelphia by one game, so it might not look like it would have affected Arizona’s season too much, much less their sweep of the Cubs and then being swept by the Rockies in the NLCS. But, Hernandez did start game 3 of the NLCS, losing it 4-1. Who knows if Haren had started that game what would have happened (especially since Arizona only scored once). But a 2-1 deficit at that stage would have been much less daunting than down 3-0 with another to play in Coors.

So while this is not ground-breaking stuff by any means, don’t be surprised when these guys make a significant difference on their clubs this year, especially if races end up being close like in 2007. It’s impossible to know for sure what will happen this time, but it just goes to show that one guy could make a difference between the playoffs and going home.

If you catch any errors in my math, please let me know.

We finally finish things off this series with the surprise division of 2007, the one that produced two playoff teams and the eventual NL champion. A couple of major moves and a lot of player signings and extensions highlight this division’s offseason.

Arizona Diamondbacks

12-14-2007: Acquired RHP Dan Haren and RHP Connor Robertson from the Oakland Athletics in exchange for LHP Brett Anderson, LHP Dana Eveland, LHP Greg Smith, INF Chris Carter, OF Aaron Cunningham, and OF Carlos Gonzalez; Acquired RHP Chad Qualls, RHP Juan Gutierrez, and OF Chris Burke in exchange for RHP Jose Valverde.
This one day pretty much sums up the major transactions during this offseason for the D’Backs. Beyond a one-year salary here or the club picking up the option there, this one day reflects the new face their team.
We’ve already examined the quality of prospects the D’backs gave up in this deal and what it did for the Oakland farm system, but how good a pitcher did they get in return? At age 26/27 last year, Haren took a sizable step up in performance, something you might expect from a pitcher of his age that has plus pitches. In fact, Haren posted career bests in all of the following numbers last season: wins, ERA, Ks, ERA+, K/9, BAA, LOB%, PRAA, VORP, Win Shares and WARP. All these while posting a BABIP that is almost exactly the average for pitchers.
Like I mentioned with Johan Santana, I want to look at Haren and Santana and their new NL context in an article hopefully before the season starts, but here are Haren’s number against the NL during interleague in his career:
7-2, 2.93 ERA, 61 Ks, and a line against of .219/.285/.362 in 12 games and 83 innings. Not too bad.

In the Valverde deal, the D’Backs received two players that will be on their opening day rosters. One is Chris Burke, the former Astros’ uber-prospect. Why he didn’t exactly work out as planned is still somewhat a mystery, but it probably has to do with a number of factors such as inconsistent playing time, having to learn three different positions when they were not benching Biggio, and never being able to consistently take a walk and get on base (something the Astros needed in their one and two hitters). Burke for his career has a 0.41 BB/K ratio in 1155 PA.
Qualls is currently slated to pitch the 8th inning with Brandon Lyon being named the closer. A careful look at Qualls’ numbers over his career show some interesting details that perhaps Arizona should consider. Qualls’ numbers against him over 521 career 8th inning plate appearances are an average .281/.344/.400 with a 112 OPS+ against. In the 9th inning, over 126 PAs, Qualls’ number show .189/.274/.297 with a 63 OPS+ against. What do these numbers really tell us? Not much. But if you are like me and believe that the more innings a pitcher throws, the larger the sample size becomes, the more he begins to show his “true self” and what type of pitcher he is. After four years, we have a pretty good idea of what kind of 8th inning pitcher Qualls is. Conversely, these are Lyon’s numbers in the 8th and 9th innings over his career:
8th - .251/.297/.405 with 78 OPS+ over 483 PA
9th - .293/.338/.457 with 102 OPS+ over 328 PA
So maybe there should at least be some consideration given to those two switching roles. Or better yet, you could actually use your best reliever whenever the score calls for it in the late innings, not just the ninth? Oh, who am I kidding…

Colorado Rockies

11-29-2007: Re-signed C Yorvit Torrealba to a two-year contract with a mutual option for 2010.
This deal, worth $7.25m was to keep their starting catcher in the fold for perhaps the next three years. The Rockies already have a potent offense batting in front of him, so his bat is not crucial to their success, but Torrealba is the very definition of average when it comes to catchers. Below is a comparison of the 2007 averages for MLB catchers compared to Torrealba’s 2007 numbers:

2007 catchers     Stat     2007 Torrealba
.255                       AVG         .255
.321                       OBP         .323
.393                       SLG         .376
.244                       EqA         .235

But compared to catchers like Brian Schneider and Jason Kendall, he is a steal.

1-18-2008: Signed OF Matt Holliday to a two-year contract.
There is not much you can say about Matt Holliday negatively when it comes to his past two offensive seasons. He is simply a masher - and everything, his Avg, OBP, SLG, VORP, RC, everything - was in the top ten in the NL in 2007. Like I said, it’s hard to find something to criticize, but that’s why I am here. Please don’t misunderstand, Holliday is an amazing player, and at 28, should continue to be an amazing player for years. But, there are some numbers that could predict a little bit of a dropoff for Holliday in the near future.
In 2006, Holliday was fourth in the NL with a .351 BABIP, a very high number - one that could lead the league some years. He also had a HR/FB ratio of 18.2% placing him in the top 15 in the NL in that category also. So, one would expect in 2007 that those numbers would reduce and even out some to the norm. Well, that’s not what happened. In 2007, Holliday raised his BABIP to .377 (best in the NL) and his HR/FB rate, even though it dropped a little to 17.9%, put him sixth in the NL for that number. Even though Coors Field tempers these numbers a little bit and does strange things with them, the increase or plateau he now sees in those categories can certainly not continue forever. Combine these numbers with the fact that he has also been in the top 25 for GB% in the NL two years running, and you could see a slight decrease in production (FB and GB both have rates of turning them into outs of over 70%).

1-23-2008: Signed SS Troy Tulowitzki to a six-year contract.
The defining move of the Rockies’ offseason, and in my opinion, one of the best signings in years relative to what a team had to pay for the actual value of a player. Tulowitzki, who is 23 this year, signed a six-year deal worth $31m - but one that is EXTREMELY backloaded. Troy will not make more than a million bucks a season until 2010.
Averaging $5m a year for a SS who was top-five in the NL in 2007 in HR, RBI, Avg, OBP, SLG, RC, RC/27, VORP, WPA, and Win Shares is downright amazing. Plus, he will only be 29 at the end of this deal. 29!
In all of this, we haven’t even talked about the defense yet. Tulowitzki was the best shortstop in the National League last year - as shown by his winning John Dewan’s Fielding Bible award for 2007 with an amazing +35, 20 more than any other NL SS. Last year, Tulo was number four in the NL with an RZR of .861, which is impressive enough, but he also led in NL in reaching balls out of his zone with 87. Your other great offensive shortstops in the NL (Reyes, Rollins and Ramirez), averaged 56 last year.

2-11-2008: Signed INF Garrett Atkins to a one-year, $4.3875 million contract, avoiding arbitration.
Although Atkins is not near the defensive player Tulo has become (only .613 RZR, -29 in the Fielding Bible, and -17 RAA for Atkins), this is still a relative steal when comparing Atkins to other NL third basemen. In fact, you can realistically make the argument that only David Wright, Miguel Cabrera, Chipper Jones, and Ryan Braun were better offensive NL 3B last season (with perhaps Aramis Ramirez in the argument, too). With Braun now in the OF, Jones another year older and Cabrera switching leagues, this 28-year-old has a shot to be a top-3 3B in his league this year. And the other five players I just mentioned average over $8m in salary this year, and that includes Braun who will make less than a million in 2008.

Los Angeles Dodgers

12-12-2007: Signed free agent CF Andruw Jones to a two-year contract.
Besides signing a new manager and a slew of new coaches, this was the one LA move of any note this offseason. I wondered quite a while back what would actually happen with Jones after this uncharacteristically bad 2007. The power went away, any on-base ability went away, and a number of other factors culminated in his poor showing in 2007. As I suspected, one of the key things I examined in that post turned out to hold true all year long. Jones’ FB% was the highest of his career - 43.9%, a sure sign he was trying to homer his way into a big contract. But all that hacking didn’t pay off as his HR/FB ratio of 13.4% was by far the lowest of his career. So a greater number of fly balls with less of them going for homers means a whole lot of outs compared to his numbers in the past.
On the other hand, his defense is still stellar. He was a close second in the Fielding Bible awards this year, with a +24, but still leads all CF over the past three years by a wide margin (Jones is at +63, while the next closest is +46). Also, his .921 RZR was first among CF in the NL, and second among all OF to only Eric Byrnes (.923).
So a two-year $36m deal ($12m of which is signing bonus), isn’t quite what he hoped for, especially seeing what Torii Hunter received, but he will take it and do this whole song and dance again in a couple of years.

San Diego Padres

12-12-2007: Signed RHP Jake Peavy to a five-year contract with a club option for 2013.
Not only the 2007 Cy Young, but also the NL pitching triple crown winner (ERA, Ks, Wins). Only 26 on opening day this year, Peavy already has three seasons of at least 13 wins with an ERA under 2.90 in his career. That may not sound too impressive, but Peavy is the first person to have three such years by age 26 since Jose Rijo in 1988-1991. Throw in three seasons where he also had at least 215 strikeouts and you are looking at the NL’s most dominant pitcher until someone else proves otherwise.
His 2007 was so dominant, in fact, that he led the NL in wins, ERA, strikeouts, WHIP, VORP, and WPA. He was second in LOB% with an amazing 78.3% and only four qualifying pitchers gave up fewer homeruns than Peavy.
The first two years of his deal are worth $14.5 m, while the last three are worth $52m - but for a pitcher who will only be 31 when the contract is up, this was a must-do for the Friars.

12-15-2007: Acquired OF Jim Edmonds and cash from the Cardinals in exchange for minor league 3B David Freese.
Every relevant offensive statistic that you can think of has declined four years in a row for Edmonds, who is thought to be the Padres’ new CF. We’re talking cumulative numbers, rate stats, ratios, anything. But most importantly, his games played has decreased every year. Now almost 38, his years of flying around the outfield have caught up with him - so much so that his fabled defense in CF has failed him for years. Two years running, Edmonds has been negative in the Runs Above Average category used to measure defensive proficiency. Edmonds also ranked in the bottom five in the Fielding Bible awards in 2007, again measuring a negative value.

12-26-2007: Signed RHP Mark Prior to a one-year contract.
From the Associated Press:

“Mark Prior didn’t experience any pain in his surgically repaired right shoulder during his first spring training workout with the San Diego Padres”

Just wait, Padres. Just wait.

2-12-2008: Signed INF Khalil Greene to a two-year contract.
Greene’s offensive numbers the past three seasons:
2005  56 RC  95 OPS+
2006  54 RC  97 OPS+
2007  83 RC  100 OPS+

Greene’s defensive rankings among NL SS the past three seasons:
2005 - 14th in RZR - 16th in OOZ
2006 - 7th in RZR - 14th in OOZ
2007 - 5th in RZR - 5th in OOZ

Did Greene just dramatically improve offensively and defensively over the course of one season? Time will tell and we will need this season and more to judge how he fares in both, but Greene is clearly beginning to develop on both sides. He has been in the top ten in the Fielding Bible Awards for two years in a row and his SLG percentage was his highest ever, although at the expense of the lowest OBP, LD% and highest FB% of his career.

San Francisco Giants

12-1-2007: Declined to offer arbitration to OF Barry Bonds
And now spring training has started and he is still waiting. That Hall class of 2012 with him, Clemens, Biggio, Sosa, et al is going to be very interesting to watch.

12-12-2007: Signed OF Aaron Rowand to a five-year contract.
This is the Giants’ projected lineup for this season:

Dave Roberts LF
Kevin Frandsen 3B
Randy Winn RF
Bengie Molina C
Aaron Rowand CF
Ray Durham 2B
Dan Ortmeier 1B
Omar Vizquel SS

Last year, Rowand earned 23 Win Shares by himself. The other seven giants in the lineup earned 67. Rowand earned more than a third of the total of the rest of the batters just by himself.
Also last season, Roward accumulated 98 RC by himself; the rest of the lineup - 419. Again, Rowand by himself with more than 20% of the total of the rest of the lineup. So can Rowand come in and almost single-handedly bring the Giants’ offense to a level of at least mediocrity? In 2007, the Giants had the following ranks in each of these categories:

OBP 27th
AVG 27th
Runs 29th
SLG 30th
OPS 30th
Total bases 30th

The answer is, probably not. You see, the Giants achieved these figures with Mr. Bonds. His totals in the Win Shares and Runs Created departments were 21 and 92, respectively, compared to 23 and 98 for Rowand. So has the offense improved? Probably not. Has the defense improved? Most definitely with Bonds gone and Rowand in center. Has the pitching improved? The Giants sure hope Lincecum and Cain take a step forward and Zito improves, but it looks to be a long season by the bay in 2008.

So there you have it. While admittedly leaving out some analysis of some of the deals that took place after I wrote up the division (namely the Bedard deal), these are the major and not-so-major moves for the 2008 season.

I will get back into more of the stats stuff with my next post.

I promise this will not be as long as the NL Central post from a few days ago. But then again, the NL East has made some pretty significant moves this offseason, so maybe I will retract that. Let’s jump right in,

Atlanta Braves

11-16-2007: Acquired OF Josh Anderson from the Houston Astros in exchange for RHP Oscar Villarreal.
The Braves were faced with quite a challenge when Andruw Jones left for the Dodgers. How do you replace a perennial Gold Glover and a huge bat (at least in 2005 and 2006) in center field? Well rookie Anderson will be fighting another offseason pickup for that CF spot, but he certainly won’t be contending for any Gold Gloves or slugging titles - Anderson had a lower SLG than OBP last season, although his line was an impressive .358/.413/.403 in his first 67 major league at bats.

11-19-2007: Signed LHP Tom Glavine to a one year contract for the 2008 season.
Likely his last year, 42-year-old Glavine returns for one more go around with the club with whom he had so much success. Here is an interesting stat about Glavine: he shows up in the Cy Young voting 6 times between 1991 and 2000, winning it twice. But in the years he shows in the voting, he has never been lower than third place.
Glavine joins a rotation that now consists of John Smoltz, Tim Hudson, Chuck James, and Mike Hampton if he stays healthy. And while Atlanta still has a competent lineup including Teixeira, Chipper, Francouer, and McCann, I can’t help but wonder if Glavine wishes he was still part of the Mets’ rotation now that they are favored in the National League.

1-14-2008: Acquired OF Mark Kotsay from the A’s in exchange for RHP Joey Devine, RHP Jamie Richmond, and cash considerations
The other candidate for the CF spot in Hot-lanta. Diaz and Francouer have the other spots sewed up, so whomever does not start out of Anderson and Kotsay, the other becomes the primary backup at all three positions.
Kotsay never had an OBP over .332 in his last three years in Oakland, so that was definitely not going to cut it there. The interesting thing, though, about Kotsay is that while his Avg., OBP, SLG, BB%, BABIP, and RC/27 have all been at or below league average over the past two years, his K% remains as great as ever. Kotsay almost never strikes out, and he has never had a K rate that was worse than league average. In 2004, when Kotsay had a career high 673 PAs, he only struck out 70 times, for a K% of 11.8%. In perspective, only seven players in 2004 had at least 670 PAs and 70 or less strikeouts that season. Maybe that’s why the A’s loved him.

1-24-2008: Signed RHP Rafael Soriano to a two-year contract.
The new closer of the Braves signs on after a stellar 71 games in 2007 where he saved nine in limited ninth-inning duties, but posted an ERA of 3.00, a WHIP of 0.861, and an ERA+ of 142. His career K/9 has been pretty good, his career BB/9 is great - but watch out for his BABIP numbers this year. In 2007 Soriano’s was .208, about 90 points below the average for pitchers.

Florida Marlins

12-5-2007: Acquired RHP Burke Badenhop, RHP Eulogio De La Cruz, RHP Dallas Trahern. LHP Andrew Miller, and OF Cameron Maybin from the Detroit Tigers in exchange for LHP Dontrelle Willis and 3B Miguel Cabrera.
One of the two biggest moves of the MLB offseason, and the one major move by the Marlins unless you consider signing Dallas McPherson or Luis Gonzalez major moves.
Once again I will go back to Baseball Prospectus’ Future Shock series to look at the prosepects now residing in the Marlins’ farm system. After this trade - getting rid of two stars they would not have been able to afford anyway - Maybin and De La Cruz wind up 1st and 10th, respectively in Florida’s system, with Trahern just missing the cut. Scouts call Maybin the next best hope we have of seeing a true five-tool player. His cumulative minor league line reads .316/.409/.523 with 14 HR and 25 SB in just 91 games.
The other gem of this trade, although no longer a prospect, is pitcher Andrew Miller. Miller, a 23-year-old with devastating stuff has drawn Randy Johnson comparisons as a tall, lanky, LHP with dominating pitches. Evidence of this can be seen in the famous game he pitched in July 2007 against the Red Sox. In winning that game, Miller pitched seven innings, gave up only three hits and struck out six as a 22-year-old rookie.
Both Maybin and Miller will be immediate fixtures in the Marlins’ lineup - for about $2m combined.

New York Mets

11-19-2007: Re-signed 2B Luis Castillo to a four-year contract.
To be honest, I just don’t know what to think about this contract. I mean, the only other 2B on the Mets’ roster is Ruben Gotay, so I guess they had to have somebody, I just slightly question four years for Castillo. Since 1999, Castillo has been an offensive player who always gets on base (.368 career OBP), scores runs (never less than 72 since 1999), steals bases (325 careers SB), and who has always worked on not striking out (21.6% K rate in 1998 to 8.2% in 2007). And on the defensive side, Castillo ranked in the top ten for all MLB 2B in John Dewan’s Fielding Bible plus/minus rankings from 2004-2006. So he is doing his two jobs correctly.
It’s just that he is 32 now, and the offensive numbers he is known for like OBP, BB%, and LD% have all been in slight decline the past three years.

11-20-2007: Acquired C Johnny Estrada from the Brewers in exchange for RHP Guillermo Mota.
And then didn’t offer him a contract, making him a free agent. He will pop up again soon.

11-30-2007: Acquired OF Ryan Church and C Brian Schneider from the Washington Nationals in exchange for OF Lastings Milledge.
In this deal, the Mets get two starters for their 2008 squad and the Nats get a former uber-prospect that didn’t turn out to be quite what the Mets hoped for. More on that later.
For the Mets, Church and Schneider will replace Shawn Green and Paul Lo Duca. Church and Schneider’s combined RC/27 last year was 9.3, while the combined number for Green and Lo Duca was 9.2. So we can call it a wash on offense. They will be hitting 7 and 8 anyway.

2-2-2008: Acquired LHP Johan Santana from the Twins in exchange for OF Carlos Gomez, RHP Deolis Guerra, RHP Philip Humber, and RHP Kevin Mulvey.
Everyone now understands two things about this trade from all the attention it has gotten the past 10 days: 1. that the Mets got some sort of a steal of a deal, especially in that they got to keep their number one rated prospect, and 2. Santana is the best pitcher alive. So there is no need for me to focus on either of those things.
Let’s try to put Santana in the NL context. The simple way to do it is to look at how Santana has fared against the NL in his career. Well, it isn’t pretty for the rest of the Senior Circuit. Santana has started 24 games against the NL and is 16-4 with a 2.27 ERA and 191 Ks in 182.2 innings. Wow.
In the next few days, I plan to do some more in depth research actually trying to place Santana in real life NL situations. For example, since Santana has now replaced Tom Glavine in the rotation, what would have happened if Santana had pitched Glavine’s starts in 2007? Stay tuned…

Philadelphia Phillies

11-7-2007: Acquired RHP Brad Lidge and INF Eric Bruntlett from the Astros in exchange for OF Michael Bourn, nonroster 3B Michael Costanzo, and RHP Geoff Geary.
For the past four seasons, these are Brad Lidge’s ranks for K/9 among all MLB pitchers with at least 50 IP for the season:
2004 - 1st
2005 - 1st
2006 - 2nd
2007 - 6th
There are two ways to look at those numbers. One is to say that he has obviously been declining in his strikeout numbers; Lidge’s most potent weapon, for the past few years, maybe as a result of fatigue, maybe recurring psychological factors from the Pujols homerun, etc. Or, you can say, even with his K/9 rate at its lowest in four years, it was still 11.82 K/9 for the season. I am sure the Phillies are basing the trade on the latter. The only thing that seems to have changed for Lidge the past two seasons since that homerun is his BB/9 numbers, which have been in the 4.03-4.32 range instead of the 2.85 and 2.93 it was in ‘04 and ‘05. This actually may be a factor of the homerun, not wanting to put balls in the middle of the plate in the tight 8th- and 9th-inning pressure situations. Prediction: he will do no worse than Brett Myers did as the Phillies closer in 2007.

11-10-2007: Signed LHP J.C. Romero to a three-year extension, with a club option for a fourth year.
I didn’t know we had reached the point where LOOGY’s are getting three and four year guaranteed contracts; especially worth $12m and potentially $16m overall.
We will have to wait to pass judgment until we see which version of Romero the Phillies are going to get. He is always dominant against left-handers, posting a .202/.298/.303 line against them in 2006 and a .208/.333/.312 line in 2007. But against right-handers he is more of a mystery. In 2007, he was an outstanding .198/.350/.328 against them, but in 2006 - .382/.455/.578 against right-handed batters.

1-31-2008: Signed 3B Pedro Feliz to a two-year contract with a club option for 2010.
Possibly three seasons for a third baseman with a career .288 OBP. In perspective, Adam Everett has a career OBP of .299.

Washington Nationals

11-30-2007: Acquired OF Lastings Milledge from Mets in exchange for OF Ryan Church and C Brian Schneider.
Maybe only 19 minor league games was a little too fast for young Lastings. His minor league numbers of .342/.395/.575 screamed to get him to the show, but his demeanor and attitude once he was there shouted back that he might need some more seasoning and maturity. Well he is the Nats’ problem now, and he immediately becomes the team’s projected CF on opening day. Numbers like .272/.341/.446 in your first 59 MLB games is not horrible by any means - but a talent like him being traded so quickly is surely a red flag.

12-11-2007: Signed C Paul Lo Duca to a one year contract.
So the Mets and Nats wind up switching starting catchers, just not through a trade. I wonder how many times that has happened throughout history? This would be a steal if we were about to start spring training in 2001. Now, Lo Duca is just old.

1-31-2008: Signed C Johnny Estrada to a one-year contract.
“….wait, didn’t we just sign another catcher the Mets let go? Well, can we train one of them to play shortstop? They both hit better than Christian Guzman…”

One more post to go with this series. The goal is to have it up by the time pitchers and catchers start their workouts.

Being about three weeks from the start of Spring Training, most of the deals and signings have been completed, with the exception of the Santanas and the Bonds out there who are still looking and wondering where they will be in two months.

We have already gone through the AL side of things, looking at each teams major (and a few minor) deals and signings. Today starts the Senior Circuit, beginning with the largest division in baseball, the NL Central.

Chicago Cubs

11-26-2007: Re-signed free agent RHP Kerry Wood to a one-year contract
With some combination of Zambrano, Hill, Lieber, Lilly, Marquis, and Marshall rounding out the rotation, Wood is obviously being brought back for the bullpen. Wood has played in only 47 games the past three years due to injury, starting 14 of them. In 2003, Wood finally rounded into form the way many expected he would after his 1998 Rookie of the Year campaign including the game where he threw a one-hitter and struck out 20 Astros. IN ‘03 he became an All Star, going 14-11 with a 3.33 ERA and 135 ERA+. Then the injuries started, and from 2004 to 2006, the numbers became merely mediocre for such a talent. Finally returning from injury last year to come out of the bullpen in 22 games, Wood had an ERA+ of 140 (his highest ever), and began to get consideration for the closer role. With Dempster likely out of that role this season, it may be between Howry and Wood come Spring Training.

12-12-2007: Did not tender a 2008 contract to RHP Mark Prior, making him a free agent.
And here is the other Cubs phenom to succumb to injury woes after such a promising start to his career. Prior was the #2 overall pick out of USC in 2001, and after a very strong rookie year in 2002, the Cubs thought they had hit the jackpot in 2003 after an outstanding 18-6 season with a 2.43 ERA (two runs lower than the lgERA), a 1.103 WHIP, 178 ERA+ (2nd highest in the NL), 245 Ks, and a PRAR of 104. Then, after a mental breakdown in the 2003 NLCS, the injuries started up, and Prior has pitched inn just 57 games in the past four seasons, and none last year.
On December 26, Prior signed a one-year contract with the Padres worth $1m, but includes $4.5m in incentives.

12-19-2007: Signed OF Kosuke Fukudome to a four-year contract.
This four year deal was in the neighborhood of $48 million dollars which immediately makes Fukudome the fourth highest paid position player on the team.
From ESPN: Fukudome “has 192 homers with a .305 batting average and .397 on-base percentage over nine seasons with the Chunichi Dragons,” but he also had elbow surgery in August, something the Cubs must not be worried about too much if they signed the 30-year-old for four years. Fukudome apparently also told the Cubs he is most comfortable batting third, but with Soriano, Lee and Ramirez in that lineup, I just don’t see that happening.

1-16-2008: Signed RHP Jon Lieber to a one-year contract.
If Dempster and Marshall are both going to be in the rotation, this move makes a little less sense than it already does. Lieber, while he did win 20 games in 2001, will be 38 the first week of the season and he has had an ERA+ that is only perfectly average the past four years. The past two years, his ERA has been above the adjusted lgERA with an average WHIP around 1.375.
The Cubs hope these numbers suffice for a #4 or 5 pitcher moving from one of the premier hitter’s parks in the league (Citizen’s Bank Park).

Cincinnati Reds

10-31-2007: Exercised the 2008 contract options on 1B Scott Hatteberg, OF Adam Dunn and C Javier Valentin.
I want to discuss Dunn here, who will receive $13 million from the Reds after they exercised his 2008 option, the last year on his contract. Dunn is an amazing power hitter. He now has at least 40 HR in four straight seasons. Off the top of my head I can’t think of anyone else who can claim that feat. Despite the number of strikeouts, his OBP has always been amazing because of the number of walks he takes (over 100 for four straight years). But if I were the Reds - and I’m not, they are way smarter than me - I just would not pay Dunn $13 million to play in left field.
In 2007, Dunn’s Batting Runs Above Average was 32 - so 32 runs better than your average LF. In the same season, his Fielding Runs Above Average was -18 or 18 runs worse than your average LF. If you go by the common perception of 10 runs earned or lost for a player equals a win or loss, the Reds are losing two extra games per year by leaving Dunn in left.
People say “move him to first to make up for it!” Hold on there. For his career, Dunn’s Fielding Rate (where 100 is average, and it is measured over 100 game periods) is 91 in 830 games in left. In 108 games at first, his Fielding Rate is 92. Both numbers come in well below average.
Dunn belongs in the AL, plain and simple.

11-28-2007: Signed free agent RHP Francisco Cordero to a four-year contract with a club option for 2012.
This contract is for four years, $48m, with a club option for year five (not to mention a full no-trade clause for the first two years). Do you think if he had opened 2007 with 30 or 35 straight saves instead of only 22 they would have given him 50 or 60 million?
These contracts for relievers who only pitch 60-80 innings a year are getting a little ridiculous, right? If you do want to look at just saves, we can - after the 22 straight, he was only 22 for 29 the rest of the year. But looking at some deeper numbers, I can try and show you why $48m is just not worth it. And we don’t have to go any farther than the Reds to do it. Let’s compare Jared Burton (of the Reds’ bullpen) and Cordero from last year:

Cordero: ERA 2.98, ERA+ 150, HR/9 0.57, AVG. .225, WHIP 1.11, BABIP .341, LOB% 73.4
Burton: ERA 2.51, ERA+ 185, HR/9 0.42, AVG. .188, WHIP 1.16, BABIP .234, LOB% 75.2

Cordero will make $8.5m next year, while Burton will make about $400K. Now I am not saying that Burton should be handed the job based on one season of great work, I mean Cordero has 177 career saves under his belt, but I think smarter decisions need to be made when deciding where to spend almost $50m.

Houston Astros

11-7-2007: Acquired OF Michael Bourn, nonroster 3B Michael Costanzo and RHP Geoff Geary from the Phillies in exchange for RHP Brad Lidge and SS Eric Bruntlett.
Costanzo, a great 3B prospect, went away in another trade, so this inevitably left the Astros with Bourn and Geary for Lidge (Bruntlett was just a role player throw-in). Obviously the Astros decided to give up on Lidge, who they felt (wrong or right) that he never recovered from the 2005 NLCS Pujols homerun in game 5. We will discuss Lidge when we get to the NL East, but now we must look at Bourn, the Astros’ probably opening day CF. Bourn is the fastest guy the Astros have seen in a long time, but as he will be hitting leadoff, he must be judged as a true leadoff hitter - and not just against the Astros’ former failures at that spot the past three years (Biggio and Taveras). His OBP of .348 in 119 games as a rookie last year falls right in line with his numbers in the minors, as does his SLG of .378. His BB/9 rate of 9.8% is a little low, and the Astros desperately need him to learn patience at the plate. The Bill James, Marcels, and PECOTA weighted means projections all have Bourn listed at less than 300 PA for the year, so that doesn’t bode well for the projectionists thinking he will keep his job. The other options are Reggie Abercrombie and Darin Erstad, so it definitely doesn’t get any better.

11-16-2007: Acquired RHP Oscar Villarreal from the Braves in exchange for OF Josh Anderson.
Out of all the Astros’ moves in the offseason, this one might be the best for Houston in terms of what they gave up and got back. Anderson was a great hitter in his limited role in 2007, and Lord knows the Astros could use some backup OF help, but with Lidge, Qualls and Wheeler all gone, the bullpen is in a desperate situation. Villareal has a career 3.71 ERA and 121 ERA+. He has pitched over 75 innings three times, and over 90 twice. He looks like the new 8th-inning man in Houston

12-2-2007: Signed free agent 2B Kazuo Matsui to a three-year contract.
This deal is worth $16.5m for a 32-year-old second baeman. I guess that’s better than a 41-year-old second baseman like 2007. Matusi is the latest marginal player to parlay a good season or two in Colorado to a large contract somewhere else. One day, someone is going to catch on that these park-inflated numbers have a very hard time carrying over to other, less hitter-friendly parks. You name an offensive stat, and Matsui had his career high in it last year: AVG, OBP, R, SB, BABIP, RC, or whatever. And when you reach your career highs at age 31 while only playing in 104 games, you know something must be up.
Matsui is, however, a very competent 2B, with career numbers all on the plus side for any defensive metric you can find. This deal might work out in the Astros favor as long as they keep Matsui out of the two hole like is being discussed by Cooper and Wade, and drop him down to about 7th behind all the bigger bats.

12-12-2007: Acquired SS Miguel Tejada from the Baltimore Orioles in exchange for OF Luke Scott, RHP Matt Albers, LHP Troy Patton, RHP Dennis Sarfate and 3B Mike Costanzo; Did not offer a 2008 contract to SS Adam Everett, making him a free agent.
Let’s pretend for a minute that there is no chance of the Astros having to play 25, 50, or even 162 games this year without Tejada, and examine the trade as the Astros intended it when it actually happened. Anyone who thinks the Astros are getting the same SS who was the MVP in 2002 or the 150-RBI man from 2004 needs to rethink things, and not just because of steroid allegations. Still, Tejada’s 162 game averages for his career look like .287/.344/.477 with 181 hits, 27 HR, and 108 RBI. That is a stout offense for any NL shortstop, even if they do play in the NL east. Comparing Tejada to the previous SS regime, it’s not even close. From 1999 to 2006 in Tejada’s amazing games played streak, the lowest number of Runs Created for one season was 94. Everett, on the other hand, has never had more than 60 RC in a year.
Comparing the defense of the two, where you could argue Everett makes up ground; the numbers for RZR were .871 for Everett and .830 for Tejada in 2007. For FRAA, Everett is at 26, while Tejada comes in at -12 for the past three years. There is your big difference, but Tejada’s bat doubles the difference when comparing offensive runs.

12-14-2007: Acquired RHP Jose Valverde from the Arizona Diamondbacks in exchange for INF Chris Burke, RHP Juan Gutierrez and RHP Chad Qualls
Losing Brad Lidge and getting Valverde, the NL leader in saves for ‘07, no problem right? Well maybe, maybe not. You see, if you look up VORP for relievers and total WPA (where relievers’ numbers are telling because the best make their livings in late inning pressure situations), you won’t find Valverde’s name in the top 20 of either of those lists for MLB last year.
Yes, Valverde has some good peripheral stats in his career, namely 11.46 K/9 and a .209 BAA, but the numbers like 3.84 BB/9 and .81 GB/FB ratio do scare me somewhat.

Milwaukee Brewers

10-30-2007: Declined the club option on OF Geoff Jenkins.
Thus ending the reign of the current longest-tenured player on the Brewers’ roster. The OF is crowded now with Cameron and Braun moving there, so someone had to go.

11-20-2007: Acquired RHP Guillermo Mota from the New York Mets in exchange for C Johnny Estrada.
Mota has not pitched less than 55 innings since 2001, so he is certainly a dependable reliever to eat up some innings. But the numbers tell the tale of his performance. His ERA has increased every year since his career year of 2003 with the Dodgers. Could it be that his 76 games and 105 innings pitched that year taxed his arm too much? Perhaps. His ERA+ has been decreasing as well - from 204 in 2003 to 74 last year. But all the Brewers had to do was give up their starting catcher to get Mota. And who did they get to fill that spot….

11-28-2007: Signed free agent C Jason Kendall to a one-year contract with a vesting option for 2009.
There was actually a time when Kendall was considered a really good player. Despite the fact that he never has hit for power (although he reached double digit HR three times), Kendall used to be an on-base machine, reaching .370 seven times in his first nine seasons, and passing .410 three times. Last year, that number was a career low .301 with the A’s and Cubs, and he only had 44 Runs Created, more than 20 lower than his career low to that point. But he still winds up with a job year after year even though he no longer hits for average, gets on base, hits for power, steals bases, or scores runs. Milwaukee is just the latest suitor in a desperate catcher situation.

12-10-2007: Signed RHP Eric Gagne to a one-year contract.
The Brewers sure do have a lot of turnover in the closer department, don’t they? Kolb, Turnbow, Cordero, and now Gagne. Gagne had probably the most dominant three year run of any closer in history, saving 52, 55, and 45 games - but what is less known is that he threw exactly 82.3 innings in all of those years as well, likely killing his arm. Gagne missed all but 16 games over 2005 and 2006 with various injuries and surgery. In 2007, his first year back, Gagne was again dominant in his half-season with Texas, but downright awful in the other half with Boston. Let’s see how Gagne responds coming back to the NL, more specifically the perpetually weak NL Central.

1-14-2008: Signed OF Mike Cameron to a one-year contract with a club option for 2009.
The new center fielder. Well, he will be the new center fielder beginning with game number 26

Pittsburgh Pirates

2-5-2008: Signed INF Freddy Sanchez to a two-year contract, with a club option for the 2010 season.
This is by far the most significant move of the offseason for the Pirates, if that tells you anything about the state of that ballclub.

St. Louis Cardinals

12-15-2007: Traded OF Jim Edmonds to the Padres for Minor League 3B David Freese.
It seems like father time finally caught up with Edmonds, and the Padres, needing a CF, took a chance on the soon-to-be 38-year-old. More on his numbers when we discuss the Padres, but I just wanted to point out that no matter how old he is, I am not sad to see Edmonds leave St. Louis. He was always an Astros killer. From the walkoff extra inning homerun in game six of the 2004 NLCS to his game-saving catch in center the next night to the walk he drew in game five of the 2005 NLCS to bring Pujols to the plate in that fabled at bat vs. Brad Lidge; I always hated him, but I always admired him. I don’t really buy into clutch at all, but if there was ever one guy who I would say was clutch against Houston, it was this guy. One of the two or three best highlight center fielders of my generation.

1-14-2008: Acquired 3B Troy Glaus from the Blue Jays for 3B Scott Rolen.
We talked about this a little bit when we dissected the Blue Jays, but essentially it was a trade of a potential problem for a potential problem. Rolen and his inability to get along with LaRussa and Cardinal management for Glaus and his chronic injury woes. Only somewhat surprisingly, Glaus has hit over .262 once in his entire career - but his OBP/SLG are still a great .358/.500 for his career. Glaus’ 162-game averages of 36 HR and 101 RBI would rank him as a top-5 offensive third baseman in the NL, if he can stay healthy. Since 1999, Glaus has never had an OPS+ below 113 while only playing one of those years in a park that favored hitters over pitchers - his one season in Arizona in 2005.

1-21-2008: Signed C Yadier Molina to a four-year extension with a club option for a fifth season.
Let’s hope his next four years (ages 25-28, mind you) are better than his first four, where his line reads .248/.304/.349. Those numbers are pulled down somewhat by his horrible 2006 season where he was one of the worst offensive players in baseball, but he has to have a season where he earns more than an 85 OPS+, something he hasn’t done up to this point. Molina’s evident value at this point in his career is certainly his defense - he threw out 50% of basestealers in 2007, and the Cardinals are banking on that to continue. And who knows, maybe they just got Molina in case they make the playoffs. In 29 career playoff games, Molina’s line is .316/.356/.453.

And that’s all for the NL Central, my friends. The NL East will be up in a few days. Geez, this is more than 3,000 words. I need to get a life.

There are not many things more beautiful to me than a ballpark open for the first time in the spring, or a perfectly executed hit and run, or a majestic homerun that clears a park. I can always find beauty in the simplest of forms at a baseball game, and there are not many things that rival what I see at the park.

But something that tops everything on that list is my new baby girl.

I have taken the past eight weeks off from doing something I love that in the end means nothing to spend time with someone I now adore and that now means everything. Now that things are starting to get back to a normal schedule (or as normal as it will be), I hope to be able to pick back up where I left off and get back to some research.

While I will never doubt the beauty of my new daughter, beauty on the baseball field or in the box score is something that has been debated for more than a century. Specifically with statistics, as we have seen in the past, the naked eye can often lie when it comes to observing and, in turn, trying to qualify a “good” player. Everyone knows the old quote from Bull Durham about the difference between a .250 hitter and a .300 hitter:

“…one extra flare a week, a ground ball, a dying quail… you’re in Yankee Stadium.”

Essentially, it’s VERY hard to tell between a mediocre, .250 hitter and a great .300 hitter. So when fans, announcers, managers, or anyone make general statements about how hitters perform based on what they see or what they believe, it’s always best to take it with a grain of salt.

A situation like this came up towards the end of the 2007 regular season as I was watching an Astros/Brewers game in late September.

In a game that featured two of the Majors’ top rookies for the season, the announcers on Fox Sports began discussing the value that Hunter Pence and Ryan Braun had on their teams this past year. In noting that both of them had very good batting averages (Braun finished the year at .324, Pence at .322) a comment was made along the lines of “rookies will typically hit for a higher average when they arrive in the majors because the quality of the pitchers is much better in the majors and they are able to be around the plate much more than their minor league counterparts.”

I don’t have the transcript of the game in my possession, so please don’t take that word for word, but the general idea is there. That because hitters see more hittable pitches when they come to the majors, they will be better hitters when it comes to average.

So I immediately thought, can this be true? Never mind that pitchers in the majors hit their spots better and their fastballs are faster and their breaking balls have more movement. And forget that defenses are better, travel is more brutal, and playing time for rookies is usually more sporadic; does that actually translate into better stats for rookies when they are facing tougher competition? That got me thinking about 2007 and using it as a case study for rookie production in the majors vs. their minor league numbers.

These broadcasters did not qualify their statement by specifying any level of the minor leagues, so it is pretty easy to pull a list of rookies and their 2007 MLB batting averages and compare them to their minor league career averages. I chose rookies with at least 150 plate appearances so we could see hitters who at least had routine/daily at bats. Here is the list of the 55 who qualified (actually there were 56, but Akinori Iwamura has no minor league stats to work with) ranked in order of their 2007 MLB batting average:

A simple count of these rookies shows that only 14 out of 55 (or 25%) out-performed their career minor league batting averages in their first major league season. And out of those 14, four of them beat their minor league total by .005 or less. Running a simple correlation of the two sets of numbers shows that the two sides (minors and MLB 2007) are not statistically significant (with r=.191 and p=.162). Simply speaking, looking at a player’s minor league average before 2007 would not be a good way to predict or even estimate their batting averages as a major leaguer in 2007.

You will always have your studs coming out of the minors who find a way to translate that talent into almost instant success in the majors such as Ryan Braun, Hunter Pence, and Troy Tulowitzki. But does everyone remember all of the experts’ preseason Rookie of the Year, Kansas City’s Alex Gordon? He was actually being hailed as the next Mike Schmidt. But after a few benchings and a .247 average on the year, he did not receive a single vote in the category. And what about Justin Upton, Elijah Dukes, and others who were supposed to pay immediate dividends? There are plenty just like them who did not pan out as originally advertised. And not to say Gordon won’t become Schmidt….just not this year.

So, if average is not a good predictor of success from the minors to the majors, what might be? We need to look at a more cumulative offensive statistic, not just one that says, “I got this many hits in this many at-bats.”

What I want to propose is Runs Created per Game or RC/27. We are all pretty familiar with the stat Runs Created. It simply takes into account a player’s offensive production based on runs he created for himself and for others on his team and tallies it into a calculable, sum total. What RC/27 does is ask the question, “what if there was a whole lineup of X player? How many runs would that lineup score per game?” For example, in 2007, the top three in the category were David Ortiz (surprisingly first at 10.86 runs/game), Alex Rodriguez (10.49), and Magglio Ordonez (10.12). That tells you how good these guys were - can you imagine a team that would average more than 10 runs per game? The Yankees had the highest average in 2007 with 5.83 runs per game (and their best month was September at 6.67).

Anyway, RC/27 will take into account not only the runs created by the batter by themselves as well as opportunities presented to that player by teammates and how he performed in those circumstances. Using the same 55 players, here is the list of their career minor league RC/27 numbers vs. their numbers in their rookies seasons of 2007:

Running the correlation again, we see that the numbers for RC/27 comparing minors to 2007 MLB ARE statistically significant (r=.268 and p=.05). So while not perfect, Runs Created per Game would be a much more reliable stat to judge performance across levels of competition.

My guess is that this would be partially due to the fact that a player’s pure talent should eventually translate across the levels he plays in, whether good or bad, in looking at how he performs on offense individually. Average only accounts for one piece of the offensive puzzle: how many times did I get a hit in my times at bat? It doesn’t account for walks, what type of hit it was, who was on base, whether they got the hit with one out or two outs, etc.

Another theory of mine is that in the majors, these rookies will be playing and batting in a lineup of players that (should) actually belong in the majors. I imagine that would lead to more consistent opportunities of plate appearances with men on base, men in scoring position, and also competent hitters batting behind them, allowing something like RC/27 to stabilize quicker with less variance than something like average where it is solely reliant upon batter and pitcher; one at bat. But, then again, that’s just my opinion, and the topic of a whole other post with different numbers to crunch.

Unfortunately, this is a difficult study to continue to quantify. The statement proposed by the announcers about the averages in their rookie seasons qualifies the research and limits the set of data we can use for the players. Once their second year comes around, they are not rookies anymore and their MLB numbers can’t be used anymore.

But if someone wanted to take on the task of comparing the numbers from say 1986 to 2006 for rookies and see how they correlate, I would be very interested to see it. Would average then become significant over 20 years? Would RC/27 become less so? I would be curious to know.

Just be sure to always question what you hear if it doesn’t sound right to you. There’s a good chance it’s not based on facts.

And welcome back to Baseball Notes. More to come soon…

From BaseballAlmanac.com:

“I’m not trying to be cocky, but I set such a high standard for myself. I’m not happy when I pitch seven innings and give up two runs and get a win.”

-Barry Zito

Well, then Barry Zito sure has not been very happy lately. The offseason’s biggest pitching free agent prize, who signed a seven year deal with the San Francisco Giants for over $120 million is struggling. There is just no other way to put it.

His 2007 numbers look very pedestrian to put it mildly: 9-11, 4.46 ERA, 116 Ks in 167.7 IP, 1.32 WHIP, and a .243 BAA. Quite a drop from his 2002 Cy Young numbers of 23-5, 2.75 ERA, 182 Ks in 229 IP, 1.13 WHIP, and .220 BAA.

So what happened in less than five years? Anything unusual? Why the decline? Zito is only 29, still in his prime (he won his Cy at age 24), and has moved to the better pitching league where he faces about 8.25 real hitters a game instead of 9 in the AL.

In fact, if we are using Zito’s “7 innings-2 runs-and a win” statement from above, he has only been happy on five days this whole season. Actually his best pitching of 2007 has been in the last three weeks; only four earned runs given up in four starts (but only one win), while dropping his ERA from 5.13 to 4.46.

Some relevant stats to look at and compare from 2002 to 2007 for Zito (click to enlarge):

Interesting things I take from this group of numbers are the following:

1. In every year since 2002, he has never bested his numbers in any of the following categories from that Cy Young season - ERA+, WHIP, K/9, BB/9, BAA, and LOB%

2. In 2002, he put up relatively low numbers for GB% (10% below his career number) and relatively high numbers for FB% (more than 7% above his career number). His LD% that year was a very average 19.8% (for some perspective, in 2006, the AL average LD% was 19.7%, and it was 20% in the NL). Are low groundball numbers and high flyball numbers the key to his success?

3. Not listed in the table, but worth noting is that Zito received 6.79 runs per game of support in 2002, third in the AL behind only David Wells of the Yankees and Derek Lowe of the Red Sox. In fact, in Zito’s five losses in 2002, the A’s scored a total of 10 runs for him.

Looking at all of this, was 2002 a perfect storm for the 24-year-old pitcher from Oakland with only one full year of MLB experience under his belt? From what I see, the numbers lean towards the answer being yes. We discuss a lot on this blog about the numbers behind the numbers. Wins and batting average and RBI are very popular, but what are the numbers and circumstances that cause those to happen? For Zito, a combination of incredible run support, the lowest numbers of his career across the board, and a team defense that was in the top 12 for the year probably led to a Cy Young award that year.

Consider, in the same year in the same league, Pedro Martinez had better numbers than Zito in ERA, ERA+, strikeouts, K/9, BB/9, HR/9, BAA, WHIP, and BABIP. But, a combination of more than a half run less of support and a team that ranked lower defensively than the A’s led to Martinez only having a 20-4 record, something that voters always use (along with teams making the playoffs) to determine their Cy Young tally. Another interesting note about Pedro’s season in 2002 - his team scored a total of three runs in his four losses.

So not only has Zito failed to reach or better any of those key statistical numbers from the 2002 season, but his run support has suffered as well. Zito’s run support from 2003 to 2007 looks like this: 4.62, 5.07, 5.16, 4.97, 3.76. None of those even coming within a run and a half of 2002 support. Sure does look like a case of everything coming together for one perfect season - and the rest of his career, he just been right around his career averages in all important categories.

But good for Barry Zito. He parlayed a Cy Young, a mythical but devastating curveball, and a laid-back, Southern California persona into a $120 million dollar contract from the Giants. So it’s not his loss for having those career numbers; it’s the Giants’ for not doing their research.

Yesterday, my brother and I were talking about our fantasy baseball league we are in together. As usual, he was singing the praises of Jake Peavy after another masterful performance (this time 7 IP, 1 ER, 11 K), and commenting how Peavy has contributed to the commanding lead he holds over the rest of us. He made the comment that he didn’t know how Peavy could not be the NL Cy Young winner this year. That led to a discussion about how voters will probably (and unfortunately) give a lot of weight to teams that make the playoffs, and if the Padres miss out, that could hurt Peavy’s chances somewhat. Who knows? It could go to Webb if the Diamondbacks stay in the lead.

I then brought up the fact that, while Peavy’s ridiculous K-rate could be accomplished anywhere, he is undoubtedly helped somewhat by the park he calls home, spacious PETCO Park in San Diego. This is a well known argument that is often used to explain why Padres pitchers have had so much success the past few years. Most things I read say Chris Young, for example, would just be a pretty good pitcher if not for PETCO Park (citing his high FB% of 53%, but a HR/FB ratio of only 2.7% in 2007), and his ERA ad WHIP would certainly not be 2.12 and 1.01 and leading the majors. In fact his park-adjusted lgERA this season is 4.12 according to Baseball Reference.

This season, according to BR, PETCO’s park factor is 94 for pitchers. If that doesn’t mean anything to you, think of it like this. A park with a rating of 100 is exactly average and even for both hitters and pitchers. Anything under 100 is considered a pitcher’s park, and PETCO rates as the best pitcher’s park in the majors this year. According to ESPN’s park factors, PETCO is in the bottom five in the majors for runs scored, HRs and hits in 2007.
And just when I was thinking about how smart I was for remembering all of this, I had to stop myself.

“Wait a minute. Didn’t I see some stats that showed just the opposite when I was watching the Padres the other night?”

So I had to go check, and sure enough I was right. Here are Peavy’s home/road splits for ‘07 so far:

That really got my mind spinning. Why is that? Not that you can be better than undefeated, but shouldn’t his other stats improve when he pitches at home, not the other way around. Well, like most things, I figured I am not smart enough to figure this one out, so I thought I should ask an expert. So I brought it up in an ESPN chat with author and contributor Rob Neyer. He should have an idea! Here is our exchange:

Ryan (Houston): Explain to me why Peavy (save last night) has been statistically better on the road than at home. Isn’t that park supposed to help him?

Rob Neyer: (12:27 PM ET ) Well, it’s “supposed” to help all pitchers, generally. But statistics don’t always happen the way they’re supposed to, particularly over just five months.

Thanks, Rob, you’re a big help. Now his point is well taken in that even five months of statistics can be misleading, and not TOO much stock should be put into them. So I went back and looked at Peavy’s 2005-2006 numbers, and, sure enough, they were statistically better (with a statistically significant difference) at home for those two years.

Granted, it’s not like he is Sandy Koufax on the road and Jose Contreras at home; he is still one of the most dominating pitchers around when he is at home. But looking past the win-loss record (which he can’t control anyway), why are the other stats significantly worse? His home stats didn’t regress back to where his road stats have always been. It’s like they swapped places or something.

But what if I’m looking at this the wrong way?

I think if you read Peavy’s home stats from left to right, our minds are immediately trained to recognize that 7-5 record, and think, “Wow, that’s not near as good as 8-0, something must be off with him at home.” Even reading the rest of the line, 2.86 is not near as good as 1.22, .236 is not near as good as .163, and .317 is not near as good as .231. But our opinion of Peavy becomes jaded when we start to compare the two lines against each other. If I just gave you stats for pitcher X who in 104 innings had 112 Ks, only 33 ER, a 2.86 ERA, 1.16 WHIP, and .236 BAA, without any other peripheral information, you would think those are phenomenal numbers.

The 7-5 record is partially due to the run support Peavy has received in his home starts versus his road starts. The Padres have scored 4.37 runs per game in Peavy’s 16 home starts compared to 5.81 runs per game when on the road.

So it might not be that there is something “off” or “wrong” with his home stats, but that his road stats are absolutely legendary. Here’s the proof:

Peavy’s K/9 at home is 9.69. That number itself would be good enough for fourth in the majors at this point. His K/9 on the road is 10.48, a number that blows away all NL qualified pitchers by two K/9 and would trail only Erik Bedard for the MLB lead.

Peavy’s HR/9 at home is 0.43 this season. That number by itself is good enough for seventh in MLB and fourth in the NL. His road HR/9 is 0.24, which by itself would automatically be the best number in the majors.

Peavy’s WHIP at home is 1.16 - a number that would be 15th in MLB by itself. His road WHIP is an astonishing 0.90, a number that would beat all other qualified pitchers in the majors by more than a tenth of a point.

Peavy’s batting average against at home is a very low .236. That number alone would be good enough for 16th amongst all starting pitchers in the majors. His road BAA is an unbelievable .163, a number that is 20 points lower than anyone else in the majors at this point (Chris Young at .184 currently leads).

Peavy’s home Batting Average on Balls in Play against him is a respectable .317 (average is about .300 - the median number for all 85 qualified pitchers is .298 this season). So he has been a little bit unlucky in this category at PETCO (perhaps because it is so spacious). But his road BABIP is an almost unheard of .231. This would be second in the majors to only Orlando Hernandez’s .220 (you want to talk about lucky, that number is 56 points lower than Hernandez’s career BABIP average). To put the number of .231 in perspective, here are the MLB leading figures in BABIP for the past five seasons:

2006: .237 (next closest was .265)
2005: .252
2004: .247
2003: .248
2002: .234

Peavy’s road BABIP in 2007 beats all of these numbers.

These numbers tell me a few things, but the most important is this: When asking the question, “Why isn’t PETCO helping Peavy’s numbers? His road stats are so much better!” The answer is - PETCO IS helping! Peavy is one of best pitchers in the majors when studying just his home numbers. The only problem is, anytime you see home numbers, you are also going to see road numbers. And when you look at his road numbers this year, you are talking about late-90’s Pedro Martinez or mid-60’s Sandy Koufax.

So don’t be like me and get fooled that just because you see a 7-5 record at home, and an ERA, BAA, WHIP, and BABIP that are all distinctly worse at home, we are talking about a pitcher who needs to make some adjustments or corrections.

The simple facts say that on the road this year, Peavy has just been flat out lucky. No pitcher is as good as Peavy’s road stats say he is this year. But, one truth in baseball is that these anomalies and things that are contributed to luck tend to correct themselves over time. So just like Neyer mentioned to me, don’t expect to see the same discrepancy in Peavy’s splits next year or any other year. Five months of stats can be tossed out and attributed to luck if you have to. But if this trend does continue; now that would be something to write about.

I was doing a bit of reading and research on Homerun Translations for something I want to write in the near future, and I came across something talking about Lou Gehrig’s 1927 monster season where he won the unofficial MVP award and finished with a .373 average, 47 HR, 175 RBI, 52 doubles, 18 triples, a 1.239 OPS, and 447 total bases (the third highest TB total of all-time).

Still, despite how incredible that season was, and how much he was recognized for it then and now, he still was not believed to have had the best season on his own team. Babe Ruth was basically deified for his 1927 season where he batted .356, had 60 HR, and 164 RBI. If you read Leigh Montville’s book, The Big Bam, you will understand the story about how 60 became the one number people all over baseball cared about. The whole nation followed Ruth’s chase to break his own 59-homer record. And all the while, Ruth overshadowed his first base teammate who actually had the better season.

So as Maris reached 61, McGwire reached 70, and Bonds reached 73, 1927 was the year everyone turned to for relflection. But it never was for Gehrig’s accomplishments, but rather for Ruth’s 60 bombs.

And while Gehrig’s 1927 season received and still does receive plenty of acknowledgment, I thought it would be fun to take the overshadowed or forgotten idea a but further and find ten of the most forgotten or overlooked offensive seasons in baseball history.

I tried to set a few criteria along the way. First, I tried to eliminate anyone who won an MVP award for the season of note. Anyone can go back and look at a list of MVPs and find a player’s name. I am more concerned with those who are lost in the record books or who might be the more obscure names. Second, you have to compare the numbers to their context or their place in history. A player who hits 52 homeruns in 1922 would get extra consideration over someone who hit 52 in 2002.

Here are ten I feel are severely overlooked, ranked from the earliest to the most recent:

Chuck Klein, 1930 Philadelphia Phillies

Klein’s numbers from the ‘30 season look like this: .386 AVG, 40 HR, 170 RBI, 250 hits, 59 doubles, 158 runs scored, a .436 OBP, and .687 SLG. The 1930 season was the odd year where the NL and AL did away with their “best player” award given out by the sportswriters; it wasn’t until 1931 that the MVP as we know it was instituted. Because there was no such award, Klein’s numbers that year remain in relative obscurity.

His 445 total bases are fourth all-time for a single season. His 170 RBI are tied for eighth best all-time, but they are overlooked because he tallied them in the same season that Hack Wilson had 191 RBI and Lou Gehrig had 175.

Hal Trosky, 1936 Cleveland Indians

Playing for an Indians team that only finished 5th in the American League, first baseman Trosky was struggling for popularity in a league with the likes of Lou Gehrig, Jimmie Foxx, and Hank Greenberg. His final line for the year was: .343 AVG, 42 HR, 162 RBI, 45 doubles, 405 total bases, .382 OBP, and .644 SLG.

Normally, you would think of a season like that as worthy of an MVP, it certainly would be close in 2007. But in 1936, Trosky finished 10th in the voting whereas perhaps two of the top nine (Gehrig and Luke Appling) deserved to actually beat him in the AL vote.

Ralph Kiner, 1949 Pittsburgh Pirates

Kiner played for a ‘49 Pirates team that finished 26 games behind first place Brooklyn that year - a year where Brooklyn and St. Louis battled neck and neck for the pennant, and was eventually won by Brooklyn by one game. Kiner was the only player in the top six of MVP voting for 1949 that was not a Brooklyn or St. Louis player. But his numbers speak for themselves: .310 AVG, 54 HR, 127 RBI, a .432 OBP, and a .658 SLG.

Kiner had a legitimate case for the MVP award that year, at least by the numbers. He finished the season first in HR, RBI, OPS, SLG, and BB; and was second in total bases. His 54 homeruns came in a year where no one else in the NL was within 18 homeruns of catching him, and the leader in the AL, Ted Williams, was 11 away.

Duke Snider, 1954 Brooklyn Dodgers

In Snider’s best year as a pro, he received only his third highest MVP voting finish of his career - fourth. He finished third in 1953 and second in 1955, but neither of those seasons looked like 1954 when Snider had totals of .341 AVG, 40 HR, 130 RBI, 39 doubles, 10 triples, 199 hits, .423 OBP, and .647 SLG.

Snider finished the year as the league-leader in total bases with 378, runs scored with 120, extra base hits with 89, and Runs Created with 160. Finishing ahead of the Dodgers outfielder were Willie Mays, Ted Kluszewski (another candidate for this list), and pitcher Johnny Antonelli. The similarities between Mays’ and Snider’s offensive numbers in ‘54 are downright eerie, but Mays, the more popular player on the much better team, won the award.

Norm Cash, 1961 Detroit Tigers

We all know what was going on in 1961, with Maris and Mantle battling all year to see if either would pass Ruth’s 60 homeruns. Maris would eventually hit number 61 on the last day of the season, and all of the press had their eyes focused on New York. Meanwhile, in Detroit, first baseman Norm Cash was putting up this line: .361 AVG, 41 HR, 132 RBI, 193 hits, 124 walks, .487 OBP, and .662 SLG. All of this only put Cash fourth in the MVP voting, behind Maris, Mantle and Diamond Jim Gentile.

Despite all of the fanfare for the two Yankees outfielders, Cash actually led the AL in AVG, OBP, OPS, hits, and Runs Created. Cash would never again have more than 39 HR or 93 RBI, but it all came together for him that summer in ‘61 - interesting to note, though, that 1962 was only his second full season in the majors.

Rod Carew, 1974 Minnesota Twins

Many people remember well Carew’s MVP year of 1977 when he hit .388 with 14 HR and his only 100-RBI season. But his next best season, 1974, was almost equally as impressive. Still, with numbers such as a .364 AVG, 218 hits, 38 SB, .433 OBP, .446 SLG, and 30 doubles, he was only able to muster a seventh place finish in MVP voting.

In a relatively down year for MVP candidates (Jeff Burroughs, Joe Rudi, and Sal Bando finished in the top three), it was hard to see how Carew did not finish higher than seventh. Power was down across the board that year - only four players in MLB hit more than 29 homeruns. So, voters were forced to look at other stats, but Carew was still overlooked. It is difficult to see why: besides power numbers, Burroughs statistics don’t even come close to comparing to Carew’s - but Carew didn’t even get one first place vote for MVP in ‘74. Minnesota was a middle of the pack team, overshadowed by powerhouses Baltimore, New York, Boston, and Oakland, and Carew would be forced to wait three more years for his MVP award.

Don Mattingly, 1986 New York Yankees

The 1985 MVP winner seemed unstoppable throughout the 1986 season as well. In fact, in every aspect of his game except RBI, his numbers were better across the board in 1986 than in his award-winning ‘85 season. Here is a comparison of the two:

So what happened? He didn’t repeat - why? Well, it took a skinny 23-year-old kid pitcher from Boston with a 24-4 record, a 2.48 ERA, and 238 strikeouts to beat out the phenomenal year from Donnie Baseball. That’s right, if not for Roger Clemens, Mattingly would have back-to-back MVPs. But we forget about Mattingly’s year because of the emergence of The Rocket. We forget that he was in the top three in all of these categories in ‘86: AVG, SLG, OPS, runs, hits, total bases, doubles, RBI, extra base hits, and Runs Created.

1996 Colorado Rockies (Galarraga, Castilla, Bichette, and Burks)

Why not throw a whole group of players from one team on the list? It’s my list, I can do that.

How can a team that scored 961 runs in a season finish just above .500 and eight games out of the playoffs? Well they would have to give up 964 runs to start. And there you have the 1996 Colorado Rockies - all bats and no pitching. The team ERA for the season was 5.60. The starter with the lowest ERA was Jamey Wright at 4.93. Their closer, Bruce Ruffin, had an ERA of 4.00! But we are celebrating forgotten offense here, so let’s take a look at the seasons produced by their four sluggers. Remember, this is all on one team in the same season:

If you remember, Ken Caminiti won the MVP in 1996, the year the Padres won over 90 games. Looking at this list, the shocking thing about this Rockies team is, not only did they mash, but they ran, too! Not on this this list is Eric Young with 53 SB and Larry Walker with 18. The team as a whole had 201 SB, first in the NL. A Colorado player led the NL in each of these categories in 1996: SLG, runs, total bases, homeruns, RBI, SB, Runs Created, and extra base hits.

Craig Biggio, 1997-1998 Houston Astros

The ‘97-’98 seasons for Biggio were some of the predominant reasons why, in his 2003 Historical Baseball Abstract, Bill James named Biggio the 35th best player of all-time (p. 361). His line for 1997 includes: .309 AVG, .415 OBP, .501 SLG, 146 runs, 191 hits, 37 doubles, 22 HR, 81 RBI, 47 SB, and 310 total bases. To follow THAT up, all he did in 1998 was: .325 AVG, .403 OBP, .503 SLG, 123 runs, 210 hits, 51 doubles, 20 HR, 88 RBI, 50 SB, and 325 total bases. In 1997, he finished fourth in MVP voting (Larry Walker won), and in 1998 he finished fifth (Sammy Sosa won of course).

Despite his outstanding, consistent, Hall of Fame career, ‘97 and ‘98 were the only times in his career Biggio reached the following marks: 190 hits, 80 RBI, 40 SB, .500 SLG, and 300 total bases. He was overshadowed by the McGwire/Sosa theater of 1998 and the epic season Walker put together in 1997 - so guys with only 20 HR didn’t get much pub. Well, he’ll get it here.

Luis Gonzalez, 2001 Arizona Diamondbacks

Can anybody else think of something that might have happened in 2001 to make people forget Gonzalez’s season that year? Oh yeah, Barry Lamar and 73 dingers. Regardless, in a championship year, Gonzalez put together one of the greatest offensive seasons of this decade. It looked like this: .325 AVG, .429 OBP, .688 SLG, 128 runs, 198 hits, 57 HR, 142 RBI, 100 BB and 419 total bases. Wow.

No one was beating Bonds for the MVP that year, and Gonzo also finished behind Sosa and his 64 HR. My feeling is that Gonzalez’s season would have won him the MVP in any other year of this decade - he just happened to have it in the wrong year. But he got a World Series-winning walk-off hit against the Yankees, so I doubt he is complaining too much.

So there you go, my list of ten. Are there any that you like better, or some that I have forgotten? Let me know in the comments.

At the end of this baseball season, two of the games best center fielders, Torii Hunter and Andruw Jones, will hit the free agent market. Both are looking to sign long-term deals even though they will both be over 30, and both will be looking for mega-bucks (presumably from their current teams, but perhaps not).

The big difference right now is that one of these guys is having a career year and watching those dollar signs go up and up, while the other one is Andruw Jones.

Partially out of sheer morbid curiosity and partially because I feel like I wasted a third round pick in my most competitive fantasy league on him, I wanted to examine this anomaly that is the 2007 Andruw Jones and see what is really wrong with him and if there are any signs of turning things around. I have a theory here, but I will share it as we get closer to the end. Here’s a clue, though….he really wants to see the money.

I hear people say all the time, “His batting average is so low, and his power is down - that’s why he is having a bad year.” Fine. But WHY is his batting average down and WHY is his power down? He doesn’t appear to be injured. He isn’t very old. It must be something else. Is he unlucky? Is he getting fooled more than he used to? Are pitchers pitching around him more? These are the questions I am looking to answer.

First let’s look at Jones’ production per year since 2000, and then his average year from 2000-2006, and his current 2007 pace for those same numbers:

So the numbers are right here in front of us and they are pretty glaring. Excluding walks, Jones is at least 15% worse than his average season in every one of the these categories. Now we need to start looking at why that is. What is causing a low average, low power, but more walks. For example, you can’t just say, “he has stopped hitting for power,” unless he is injured or old. WHY has he stopped hitting for power?

In order to not to get too confusing here, I am going to list a group of predictive stats where Jones has the lowest numbers of his career this year, and then pick a few to analyze:

Strikeout % - 27.6% (career 21.8%)
Isolated Power - .183 (career .236)
BABIP - .229 (career .284)
RC/27 - 3.77 (career 5.91)
GB/FB Ratio - .82 (career 1.03)
HR/FB - 13% (career 20.5%)
EqA - .245 (career .283)

Looking at these, combined with the fact that, despite his other struggles, he is on pace to draw the third most walks in his career, I think I have noticed a pattern. I truly feel like Jones has fallen in love with the idea that more homeruns will give him more dollars this winter and he is doing everything he can to get every last HR he can. Here are the reasons why I believe this:

Pitch Selection - The relatively high walk rate shows that he has chosen not to swing at bad pitches or ones he can’t handle well. Balls just inside or just outside that he may not be able to drive can’t help him, so he will lay off of them. Balls high or low might lead to groundballs or pop-ups, so he lays off of those too. This leads to more walks.

But, it also leads to the need to swing at almost every pitch in the strike zone, or every pitch that appears to be in the strike zone (sliders, sinkers, etc.). Jones is on pace for 1680 pitches that are strikes this season, the most in his career. Tinkering with your swing, trying to mash homeruns every time up, and favoring the back foot causes severe upper-cut swings (here is the most famous example from this season, a walk-off homerun against the Phillies on April 30) and an increased number of fly balls on balls put in play. Which brings us to the next step.

Ground Ball/Fly Ball ratios - Not mentioned above in the stats is the fact that Jones’ FB ratio is the highest of his career at 45.5%, and that his GB ratio is the lowest of his career at 37.3%. This translates into the number you do see above, which is his GB/FB ratio of 0.82, the lowest in his 10 years in the Bigs. So, almost half of Jones’ balls in play this year are fly balls instead of line drives and ground balls, where the majority of hits come from.

Compound this with the fact that his HR/FB ratio is also the lowest of his career at 13%, and you have a recipe for disaster. More fly balls in play equals more outs being made per time you put the bat on the ball, which brings up the next point; BABIP.

Batting Average on Balls in Play - This stat is becoming more and more popular to try and determine why a hitter has a certain average when it is so far above or below his career norm. A batter with abnormally high or low BABIP can usually attribute it to bad luck, and can expect some regression. But, the same light, high or low BABIP can almost always be directly correlated to success in batting average. We can apply this here to Jones. His BABIP is the lowest of his career at .229. This number is abysmally low, as an average number is somewhere around .290, and Jones is at .284 for his career.

In the second half, one would expect that number to rise just because the law of averages says it almost has to - it really is that bad. But more fly balls do lead to easier outs on balls in play, which leads to less hits and, in turn, a lower batting average. And on the at-bats where he does get a hit, the power is still not following, for reasons we talked about above, and further evidenced in my last point.

Isolated Power - Subtracting AVG from SLG can give an interested party a quick and dirty look at what kind of power a hitter displays beyond just what their batting average looks like. Before this year, Jones’ last time with an ISO number below .208 was his rookie season in 1997 when it was .185, still higher that he .183 he is displaying this year. A combination of many fly balls plus a Line Drive Percentage of 17.3% (below his career average of 18.2%) is leading to much less power for the famed slugger who hit 41 and 51 homeruns the past two seasons. So much so that Jones’ SLG% this year is more than 100 points below what his career average is (.382 to .499).

Now I am not a hitting coach by any means, but my remedy for Jones would be to expand the strike zone a little bit so he can hit to all fields (line drives to all fields, that is), while still keeping the selective eye that allows him to take the walks and get on base. Also, go back to the line drive swing that helped Jones so much in the seasons where he was hitting between 35 and 50 homeruns a year.

Homeruns might look like the key to the offseason treasure right now, but everyone is sure going to be second-guessing a 31-year-old center fielder with a batting average of .200 with no power if he ends the season that way. An all-around hitting approach would do Jones a world of good right now and, more importantly, would also allow him to help save my freaking fantasy team!