I work at a place that often gets involved in the political arena, specifically policy recommendation and research, so times like these are often quite entertaining and quite busy. My past couple of weeks have been spent working on plans for various presidential candidates we have invited to come and also hosting an event for Senator John McCain ahead of the Texas Primary. While I am not using all of that as an excuse for the delay in writing, I am using it as segue into what I will discuss today.

You see, when you host an event for a presidential candidate, there are always questions from the guests or from the audience that they would like answered. Inevitably, the two questions always raised are “would you have done X differently if you were president at that time,” and “if you are president, what will happen when you are faced with X problem?”

The candidates are a little more comfortable with the first question because hindsight is always 20/20 and they can come up with a solution that most people would approve and state how much better their solution is than the one that was made. Conversely, they get a little bit more uneasy when it comes to the second question, there are no decisions that have already been made about the hypothetical problem, thus nothing to base their answer on. And who knows, maybe they will be faced with this same problem in office, do they stick with their answer even though it may not be the best one, or decide differently, and risk looking like a liar or a flip-flopper.

I think the same holds true for baseball. It is a bit easier to look back and plug in a different solution/player/strategy than to predict the course of action for a hypothetical game situation or how a season will play out.

And thus is the nature of projections - a lot is usually right and a lot is usually wrong. However, it’s much easier to look back, take numbers we know are facts, and plug in a few new variables to make educated guesses than it is to base future numbers on unknowns.

And with that we turn our attention to the two new aces of the National League: Johan Santana and Dan Haren of the Mets and Diamondbacks, respectively. Fortunately, for the purposes of this research, both of their new teams were involved in tight races towards the end of the season, with the D’backs turning out a lot better than the now-famous collapse by the Mets the last 17 games of 2007.

While we can’t know for sure how these pitchers will perform in 2008, can we at least try to plug them onto their teams last year and see what kind of difference they would have made? Would it have caused Arizona to miss the playoffs? Caused the Mets to make the playoffs? And what is the best way to find out?

Well, also fortunate for us, we know exactly who these two new pitchers will be replacing on their new teams. Haren will replace Livan Hernandez in the rotation (who left for the Twins), while Santana will replace Tom Glavine (now with the Braves). Otherwise, the rotations seem to be the same.

With a little tweaking, and some playing with the numbers, adjusting them from league to league, I think we can tell how Haren and Santana might have affected their new teams had they been pitching instead of Hernandez and Glavine. Comparatively, Haren had 34 starts to Hernandez’s 33, and Santana also started 33 to Glavine’s 34 - so we almost come out event there already.

Here is what I think we should do:

First, we will remove one perfectly average game from Haren’s line and add one perfectly average game to Santana’s so that they will also each reflect 33 or 34 starts (I want to leave in the best and worst games because those are what make a pitcher’s season and define his consistency. See Ron Shandler’s PQS scores for more on that topic).

Second, we will subtract all of the runs allowed by Hernandez and Glavine for their teams last year from the team’s runs allowed total. We will work with both earned and unearned runs here so that the defensive aspect stays constant - it is something pitchers can not control.

Third, we have to add back in to the teams’ runs allowed totals the number of runs allowed by Santana and Haren last year. This is where it gets a bit tricky and where we have to adjust for context. In 2007, the average ERA in the AL was 4.50. In the NL, it was 4.43. So, the AL was about 2% tougher for pitchers than the NL. Keeping unearned numbers the same, we can adjust Santana’s and Haren’s earned run totals by that 2% to get a sensible estimate of what each pitcher would have done in the NL.

We will then check each team’s actual 2007 won-loss record compared to their expected won-loss record using runs scored vs. runs allowed and the Pythagenpat formula: X = ((rs+ra)/g)^.285 for the exponent and then rs^X/rs^X + ra^X for winning percentage. It has been documented that Clay Davenport, who modified the original Pythagorean Theory for win/loss by Bill James believes this Pythagenpat method is an even further improvement, so we will use that one. We will see how many wins better or worse the two teams were in 2007.

Then using the new runs allowed totals and adding them back into their new teams’ 2007 numbers, we can plug these in for runs allowed, adjust for the number of games better or worse they were above the expected outcome, and see where each team would have ended their 2007 regular season. Would the Mets have held off the Phillies? Would the D’Backs have won the division outright? Won the Wild Card? Missed the playoffs?

Here’s the math, starting with Santana:

2007 Mets - 88-74 record - 804 runs scored, 750 runs allowed for Pythagenpat record of 86-76 - two games better than projected
Glavine accounts for 102 runs - subtract from 750 to get 648
Santana accounts for 88 real runs in 2007, 81 earned
Add three earned runs to Santana’s total (an average start for Johan) to make him equal to 34 starts
Santana now has 91 total runs, 84 of them earned
Take 2% away from 84, leaving him with 82 earned runs, 89 total runs
Add 89 back into the 648 left for runs allowed for 737
Pythagenpat forumla:
X = ((804+737)/162)^.285, X = 1.90
W% = 804^1.90/804^1.90 + 737^1.90, W% = .541
New Pythagenpat record: 88-74
New actual record, 2 games better: 90-72

So now the Mets hang on and beat the Phillies (89-73) by one game to represent the NL East in the playoffs. And the 17-game collapse is all but forgotten. Until they get swept by the D’Backs.

And now for Haren:

2007 Diamondbacks - 90-72 record - 712 runs scored, 732 runs allowed for Pythagenpat record of 79-83 - 11 games better than projected
Hernandez accounts for 116 runs - subtract from 732 to get 616
Haren accounts for 91 real runs in 2007, 76 earned
Subtract three earned runs to Haren’s total (an average start for Haren) to make him equal to 34 starts
Haren now has 88 total runs, 73 of them earned
Take 2% away from 73, leaving him with 72 earned runs, 87 total runs
Add 87 back into the 616 left for runs allowed for 703
Pythagenpat formula:
X = ((712+703)/162)^.285, X = 1.855
W% = 712^1.855/712^1.855 + 703^1.855, W% = .506
New Pythagenpat record: 82-80
New actual record, 11 games better: 93-69

The D’Backs had the best record in the NL to begin with, edging out the Rockies for the WC and beating Philadelphia by one game, so it might not look like it would have affected Arizona’s season too much, much less their sweep of the Cubs and then being swept by the Rockies in the NLCS. But, Hernandez did start game 3 of the NLCS, losing it 4-1. Who knows if Haren had started that game what would have happened (especially since Arizona only scored once). But a 2-1 deficit at that stage would have been much less daunting than down 3-0 with another to play in Coors.

So while this is not ground-breaking stuff by any means, don’t be surprised when these guys make a significant difference on their clubs this year, especially if races end up being close like in 2007. It’s impossible to know for sure what will happen this time, but it just goes to show that one guy could make a difference between the playoffs and going home.

If you catch any errors in my math, please let me know.

From BaseballAlmanac.com:

“I’m not trying to be cocky, but I set such a high standard for myself. I’m not happy when I pitch seven innings and give up two runs and get a win.”

-Barry Zito

Well, then Barry Zito sure has not been very happy lately. The offseason’s biggest pitching free agent prize, who signed a seven year deal with the San Francisco Giants for over $120 million is struggling. There is just no other way to put it.

His 2007 numbers look very pedestrian to put it mildly: 9-11, 4.46 ERA, 116 Ks in 167.7 IP, 1.32 WHIP, and a .243 BAA. Quite a drop from his 2002 Cy Young numbers of 23-5, 2.75 ERA, 182 Ks in 229 IP, 1.13 WHIP, and .220 BAA.

So what happened in less than five years? Anything unusual? Why the decline? Zito is only 29, still in his prime (he won his Cy at age 24), and has moved to the better pitching league where he faces about 8.25 real hitters a game instead of 9 in the AL.

In fact, if we are using Zito’s “7 innings-2 runs-and a win” statement from above, he has only been happy on five days this whole season. Actually his best pitching of 2007 has been in the last three weeks; only four earned runs given up in four starts (but only one win), while dropping his ERA from 5.13 to 4.46.

Some relevant stats to look at and compare from 2002 to 2007 for Zito (click to enlarge):

Interesting things I take from this group of numbers are the following:

1. In every year since 2002, he has never bested his numbers in any of the following categories from that Cy Young season - ERA+, WHIP, K/9, BB/9, BAA, and LOB%

2. In 2002, he put up relatively low numbers for GB% (10% below his career number) and relatively high numbers for FB% (more than 7% above his career number). His LD% that year was a very average 19.8% (for some perspective, in 2006, the AL average LD% was 19.7%, and it was 20% in the NL). Are low groundball numbers and high flyball numbers the key to his success?

3. Not listed in the table, but worth noting is that Zito received 6.79 runs per game of support in 2002, third in the AL behind only David Wells of the Yankees and Derek Lowe of the Red Sox. In fact, in Zito’s five losses in 2002, the A’s scored a total of 10 runs for him.

Looking at all of this, was 2002 a perfect storm for the 24-year-old pitcher from Oakland with only one full year of MLB experience under his belt? From what I see, the numbers lean towards the answer being yes. We discuss a lot on this blog about the numbers behind the numbers. Wins and batting average and RBI are very popular, but what are the numbers and circumstances that cause those to happen? For Zito, a combination of incredible run support, the lowest numbers of his career across the board, and a team defense that was in the top 12 for the year probably led to a Cy Young award that year.

Consider, in the same year in the same league, Pedro Martinez had better numbers than Zito in ERA, ERA+, strikeouts, K/9, BB/9, HR/9, BAA, WHIP, and BABIP. But, a combination of more than a half run less of support and a team that ranked lower defensively than the A’s led to Martinez only having a 20-4 record, something that voters always use (along with teams making the playoffs) to determine their Cy Young tally. Another interesting note about Pedro’s season in 2002 - his team scored a total of three runs in his four losses.

So not only has Zito failed to reach or better any of those key statistical numbers from the 2002 season, but his run support has suffered as well. Zito’s run support from 2003 to 2007 looks like this: 4.62, 5.07, 5.16, 4.97, 3.76. None of those even coming within a run and a half of 2002 support. Sure does look like a case of everything coming together for one perfect season - and the rest of his career, he just been right around his career averages in all important categories.

But good for Barry Zito. He parlayed a Cy Young, a mythical but devastating curveball, and a laid-back, Southern California persona into a $120 million dollar contract from the Giants. So it’s not his loss for having those career numbers; it’s the Giants’ for not doing their research.

It is often said that if there was a wing for coaches in the Baseball Hall of Fame, there would be one man and one man only in it. Better yet, the wing would probably be named for him.

Leo Mazzone, currently pitching coach with the Orioles, is considered a miracle worker amongst baseball insiders and outsiders. His latest perceived water to wine project is often considered to be phenom, 28-year-old pitcher Erik Bedard. Bedard is 12-4 through August 20 and leads all of MLB with 207 strikeouts, already 36 more than he had in all of 2006. In my last post, a comment was made by a reader that Bedard, while playing for a perennial loser, should absolutely be considered for the Cy Young. And why not? Where would the Orioles be without Bedard? Overall, a 57-65 Orioles team is 18-8 when he starts, brining to mind memories of the mid-70’s Philadelphia Phillies when Steve Carlton would win 25 of the Phillies’ 70 total victories for the year, or something like that.

So an interesting question arises when you start to talk about these two: Bedard and Mazzone. They both arrived in Baltimore about the same time; Bedard as a 25-year-old rookie, and Mazzone as a 20-year veteran pitching coach of fourteen straight division-winning Atlanta Braves teams. They both have been credited with the success of the other; Mazzone training and tutoring Bedard, and Bedard being a young, talented pitcher that Mazzone could use as an example for his Daniel Cabreras and Jeremy Guthries. And the question that I go back and forth on is, if I was running a team, which one would I want? Bedard or Mazzone. Or, more clearly, who is responsible for the success, Bedard or Mazzone?

First, a look at Bedard’s progress over the past four seasons is needed to evaluate the change we are talking about. Below you will find a relevant season-by-season look at Bedard’s most important stats:

Also, Bedard’s RA (or Run Average, adding in unearned as well as earned runs) for the past four years starting in ‘04 reads like this: 5.44, 4.19, 4.22, and 3.09.

What may be best to do is to break these stats up into categories by whether a pitcher can control them or not. Whether a pitcher has to rely on others for the final product of the stat or if it is a result of his own doing. In tracking this, we will be able to narrow down the specific items that would be a result of Bedard’s pitching, and not the Orioles’ team play.

Items Bedard can control:
WHIP
Strikeouts
K/9
BB/9
K/BB
HR/9

Items Bedard can not control:
Starts
Record
ERA+
RA
BABIP
PRAA

It is very evident and important that we see positive trending in every one of these statistics except for HR/9. Bedard’s success has not been limited to one side or the other, but has been due to a number of factors that he can control (such as pitch count, pitch location, allowing men to be put on base) and a number of factors that he can’t (defense behind him, how many runs the offense scores, what the park factors are where he is pitching).

Now, where does Mazzone fit into all of this? Before the season started and Bedard’s tremendous success began, Leo was quoted in this article as saying,

“Great pitchers make for a great pitching coach, and a great pitching coach doesn’t mess up great pitchers.”

And when asked about pitchers’ confidence and their insecurities and how to react to those situations, he offers,

“You can’t teach it. You can’t put it on paper. You can’t do it with a radar gun. You have to read people because the game is always going to be played by human beings, and you can never take the human element out of the game.”

Now all that is well and good when you want to talk about Erik Bedard, who has become one of the premier pitchers in all of baseball. He obviously has the stuff, he just needs the confidence. But what about when you want to talk about the other side; someone who has struggled for three years with their success on the mound; someone like Daniel Cabrera.

I couldn’t have been more shocked when I found this obscure quote on CBSSportsline from Mazzone talking about Daniel Cabrera during spring training 2007,

“Daniel’s mechanics are the way you want them right now. You don’t have to tinker with him anymore. It’s a matter of him trusting himself a little more. It comes with experience and maturity.”

Huh? His mechanics are the way you want them? You don’t have to tinker with him? This is coming off a 2006 season where his 6.1 BB/9 would have been more than 2 walks higher than anyone else in that category if Cabrera had qualified with enough innings. His ERA+ of 94 would have put him in the bottom 10 in that category amongst qualified starters, and his WHIP of 1.58 would have only been better than Mark Redman and Joel Piniero.

But you don’t need to tinker with him?

Looking at these two case studies, it becomes obvious what Mazzone’s philosophy is. Mazzone can’t make the slider bend or the sinker drop or the fastball cut, he can’t magically make pitchers start hitting corners and he can’t decrease or increase the velocity of a pitch as it leaves a pitcher’s hand. Those are all mechanics that have been ingrained in a pitcher’s mind for probably 10 years before he reaches Mazzone. And while Mazzone can try to tweak something here and there, he realizes he is paid for a completely different, ostensibly more important reason.

To be a psychiatrist.

Long before a pitcher reaches the majors, it was the scout’s and general manager’s job to notice mechanics, how a pitcher has developed, whether or not they are moldable, whether they have plus pitches or not. But scouts and GMs are not developing players, much less their minds. That is where Mazzone steps in. He realizes the importance and validity of confidence, security, maturity, belief in a pitcher’s stuff, and belief in the guys playing behind him.

Is it a coincidence that the 1990 Braves had the worst team ERA in all of baseball at 4.58, but when Leo Mazzone took over in 1991, it immediately shot up to 3rd in the NL at 3.49? Is it a coincidence that Steve Avery, John Smotz, and Tom Glavine’s ERA all dropped in the season that Mazzone arrived? The Braves’ team ERA had nothing to do with the team’s improved offense in 1991. The dramatic shift in win/loss record can be attributed to both hitting AND pitching.

Admittedly, this is a hard thing conclusion for me to come to, because Mazzone’s impact on the pitchers can not be quantified, it can not be calculated, and it can not be measured. I truthfully wanted numbers to show that the pitchers like Bedard or even Cabrera* (not to mention Avery, Smoltz, Glavine, Russ Ortiz, Kevin Milwood, Jaret Wright, etc.) are doing it on their own or there was no correlation to Mazzone being a part of the team. But in a famous study done by J.C. Bradbury, the numbers are quite conclusive.

Bradbury found that pitchers under Mazzone have an ERA of roughly 0.63 lower than when they have not pitched for him (as of 2005). He equates that to the effect Coors Field generally has on a pitcher who now makes that his home, except in the opposite direction. And he advocates the Rockies hiring Mazzone to make up that difference pitchers often see when they pitch in Colorado.

There is a real life example of this when you consider Mike Hampton with the Braves before his string of injuries. Hampton in Colorado has ERAs of 5.41 and 6.15. His first two years in Atlanta under Mazzone: 3.84 and 4.28. Both of these cover the Bradbury spread of 0.63 runs from leaving Coors and 0.63 runs for having Mazzone as a tutor.

So getting back to Bedard and Mazzone, if I am picking sides, I have to take Mazzone. His effect on a cumulative pitching staff (we haven’t talked at all about relievers) is quite clearly worth more than what a dominant starter can give you every five days for seven or eight innings.

Whatever it is that he is doing, it’s working. Whether it’s confidence, maturity, or reliance, Mazzone has his pitchers convinced. And his success is the result of work far different than mechanics and proper pitching motion and velocity. His own words describe it best:

“I’ve got a degree in psychology and never went to college.”

____________

*Cabrera’s 9.1 K/9 last season would have ranked second in the AL behind Johan Santana. He is also in the top 20 this year for K/9.

A book I received for Christmas and that I often consult and reference is The Neyer/James Guide to Pitchers. If you can imagine such a volume, it lists every pitcher on record who has thrown a ball in a Major League game. Beyond that, it lists their relevant statistics, their tendencies, what pitches they threw, and in what part of their career they threw those pitches. It also includes a history of every type of pitch ever recorded from fastballs to eephus to foshballs.

In addition to the stats and lists and commentaries, my favorite part of the book are the articles at the end written by Bill James, Rob Neyer and others on a variety of different projects and experiments they undertook for the book or for their own interests. One of the more interesting and provoking pieces is one about Bill James’ Cy Young Predictor that he developed and tweaked for the book and explains in a chapter entitled E = M Cy Squared. James claims that after years of working on it, he has developed one of the most accurate formulas for predicting Cy Young winners. The formula, explained in more detail in the book and in a link I will provide later, is simply:

Wins times 6
minus Losses times 2
plus Strikeouts divided by 12
plus Saves times 2.5
plus Shutouts
plus Runs Saved
plus 12 points for pitching for a first-place team

What James claims, and there is data to back it up, is that his formula has predicted the Cy Young winner accurately almost 81% of the time. In the book you will see formula results compared to Cy Young voting for each league dating back to 1990. For example:

1990 American League
Formula:
1. Bob Welch
2. Roger Clemens
3. Dave Stewart

Voting:
1. Bob Welch
2. Dave Stewart
3. Roger Clemens

The only complaint I can come up with about the formula is that it can tend to overvalue closers somewhat. The formula predicted Cy Youngs for Eric Gagne and Billy Wagner in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Roger Clemens and Brandon Webb were the eventual winners in those years. But overall you can’t complain about 81%

So what about this year. Fortunately, EPSN runs the formula continuously on its website, and can be found at this link. For the 2007 season, the formula presently predicts the top three this way:

NL
Jake Peavy
Brad Penny
Brandon Webb

AL
John Lackey
Dan Haren
JJ Putz

After looking at the numbers, I have to say I really don’t have a problem with Lackey and Peavy winning the award this year, if that is what ends up happening. Lackey is tied for the MLB lead in wins with 15, with an ERA of just 3.07 and an ERA+ of 140, easily the highest of his career. Plus, whether you feel it is deserved or not, the Angels are in first place, which will count in voter’s minds, and why James gives this factor an additional 12 points on the scale. Peavy is 13-5 and leads the NL in strikeouts with 164. His ERA+ of 184 is off the charts as well and is also the highest of his career.

One funny thing about the NL race is that I wonder where Chris Young would be if his team had won him more decisions and if he had not spent two weeks on the DL. Young’s ERA, WHIP, ERA+, HR/9, and LOB% are all better than Peavy’s. Young has four starts this season where he has allowed one or zero runs but has recorded either a loss or no decision. Turn those games into wins (and a 13-4 record) and you are probably looking at Young in the top three of NL in the formula.

One more thing before I finish here. What the heck is going on in the West division to have all of these great pitchers?! All six pitchers listed above are in the West in their leagues, and there are also two more from each Western division in each league’s top ten. So five out of the ten in the NL and AL are from the West. Not listed above are Francisco Rodriguez, Kelvim Escobar, Jose Valverde, and Takashi Saito.

That just struck me as odd, is all. Who gets your vote for Cy Young in each league this year? Do you dare disagree with the mighty Bill James?!

I have trouble remembering a year when there was SO much hype about rookies coming up to the majors. Just some common names from this year: Philip Hughes, Hunter Pence, Tim Lincecum, Ryan Braun, Homer Bailey, Elijah Dukes, BJ Upton, Yovani Gallardo, Chris Young, Delmon Young, Alex Gordon, Billy Butler, and Andy LaRoche are just a few names that have dominated club rosters and fantasy teams from the beginning of the year - and some of these weren’t even guaranteed a spot with the big club!

In thinking about rookies, it is always difficult to predict major league success no matter what school you’re from; whether it’s makeup and body type or stats and rates, the guessing game is far from accurate. Keith Law, a former Special Assistant to the GM for the Blue Jays and Baseball Prospectus writer currently working for Scouts Inc. and ESPN, is famous for saying that the player he was the most wrong about was Carlos Pena. Pena had all the tools and all the stats - scouts and managers and GMs drooled over him. Well, ever since he made his major league debut in 2001, he has been traded twice, released twice, made two trips to the minors, and has a career .247 average - and is now 29 and moving past his prime.

This is just one example of how hard it is to predict, even on the sure things. So who knows if great years by Pence, Lincecum, Upton, et al will turn into something more? But I thought it might be fun to look at some of the best rookies from the past and see if very strong rookie seasons translates into very strong major league careers.

My hypothesis is that a even the strongest rookie season does not correlate to major league stardom.

First, we have to determine a sample size. I have chosen to look at more of a modern era for comparative reasons, and therefore look at rookies from 1975 to 2001 (rookies in 2001 have at least 5 full major league seasons and thus a good sample to work with). I want to look at only the best of the best rookie seasons - so I will start with all Rookies of the Year from these 26 seasons. But even that does not help too much because you get your Mark McGwires who batted .283/.370/.618 with 49 HR and you get your Eric Karros’ with .257/.304/.426 - 20 lines - and they were only five years apart. Those two rookie seasons don’t even compare to each other.

So I need a way to establish the best rookie seasons without using stats, because we need a way to look at both hitters and pitchers who were ROY, and compare across a span of 26 years. What I decided to use as my filter is any ROY who finished in the top 25 in MVP voting or top 10 in Cy Young voting during their respective rookie year. This will give us only the best rookie years compared to their peers that season.

For example, Alvin Davis’ ROY campaign in 1984 saw him accumulate a .284 average, 27 homeruns, and an .888 OPS. This would be above average for an offensive player in 2006, but he probably would not have received any MVP votes for that line last year. But in 1984, that line is outstanding. This way, we can compare rookies to their peers and not other rookies that played 20 years later or earlier.

Doing this, we are left with a sample of 17 rookies from 1975-2001:

This list includes 11 who finished in the top 25 for MVP and 6 who finished in the top 10 for Cy Young. Ichiro and Fred Lynn are the only ROY/MVP winners, while Fernando Valenzuela is the only ROY/CY winner.

To look at these players’ careers, we need to think about what stats to use. We could just look at Hall of Fame voting, but half of these players are not eligible, so that does not work. I am going to rely on a heavy dose of rate stats since we are dealing with four players who are still playing today, and we will have to use statistics that range across hitters and pitchers. But I will also look at a few other sorted items that help tell the story such as MVPs, All Star games, etc.

I have included an explanation of all stats in the comments section. All numbers are as of May 28, 2007:

The results I found here surprise me somewhat. All of these players except Pujols and Ichiro have finished their careers or are in their last couple of years. We can save the Ichiro debate for another time, you decide for yourself if you think he should have been labeled a”rookie” in 2001.

The stats here show that the strongest rookie seasons seem to correlate a lot more towards future success for hitters rather than pitchers.

Point in case: Each hitter on this list, assuming no tragic injuries to Pujols and Ichiro, will play at least nine seasons in the big leagues (except for Listach; more on him later). Here are some other examples…

1. Except for Davis and Listach, all other hitters on this list appeared in at least two all-star games that were NOT in their rookie season. So if you take away their great first year, you still see continued success later in their careers
2. All hitters on this list have a career OPS+ of at least 120 (average is 100), except for Listach and Coleman. Coleman is low only because he never slugged over .400, and had 28 career homeruns.
3. Except for Listach, all hitters created at least 200 more runs over their careers than a replacement player would have created (BRAR stat).

“Except for Listach,” is mentioned here three times. You must be thinking, “what about Listach? He proves your theory wrong!”

I agree, he is an outlier in this exercise and skews things a little bit. But one interesting thing about that year’s ROY voting may get us back on track. In Listach’s rookie year of 1992, he beat out Kenny Lofton in a close race. Looking back…..Lofton really should have won. He bested Listach in HR, SB, BB, OBP, SLG, OPS+, Total Bases, and RC. But Milwakuee finished with 92 wins while Lofton’s Indians finished with 76.

Lofton meets all of the qualifications above that Listach does not - 6 All-Star games, 107 OPS+, and 436 BRAR for his career - and he has played 17 seasons so far.

Pitchers on this list are a different story.

The All-Star games by these six pitchers adds up to 15 in 76 total seasons. And 10 of those are from two players (Gooden and Valenzuela).

On this list, you have at least six hitters you can make a legitimate Hall of Fame case for, while there is not a pitcher on the list who comes close to qualifying.

The pitching runs above average range from -7 to 148 - nowhere near the BRAA of 613 for McGwire or 494 for Piazza.

I guess I should not be surprised that the hitters consistently perform better than the pitchers overall on this list. Studies have shown that the peak for hitters and pitchers is from ages 26-28 (use this article as some reference for pitchers’ primes, this one for hitters). Prime years for pitchers tend to last longer than hitters, which is why you routinely see pitchers at age 35 and above still performing at high levels. For the hitters on this list, the mean age is 22.7 during their rookies years, while it is only 21.5 for the pitchers in their rookie years. The hitters compared here came to The Show more seasoned and experienced than their pitching counterparts.

So my hypothesis is only half right. I predicted that an unusually strong rookie season would in no way correlate to becoming a star later in a career. While two of the pitchers on this list (Gooden and Valenzuela) arguably had at least five years of dominant performances, the others essentially amounted to nothing. On the other hand, the hitters on this list average 5.6 all-star games each - and yes, that includes Listach and his zero appearances.

From this small sample, we can make the assumption that a strong showing by a hitter in their rookie year will more likely lead to future success than a strong first season by a pitcher.

So the sudden demotion of Brad Lidge after one save opportunity and one case of mop-up duty this season got me thinking about the long, long, term affects of Lidge and other closers who have given up walk-off homeruns in critical or season/series-altering situations.

A lot has been made of the “psychological” affect a hit or homerun like the one Pujols hit in game 5 of the 2005 NLCS can have on a closer. Does he lose his edge? Does it have long-term effects? Will it alter how he pitches and, in turn, his ability to deceive hitters and get them out?

This project will consist of six closers I could think of off the top of my head who gave up pivotal or series-ending hits (5 homers, one single) that cost their team a lead, game or series in the past 25 years (when closers have actually had prominent, defined roles). I will then look at the effect it had or has had on their careers to this point, including immediately after their infamous outing. Starting with the earliest and then going to the most recent:

Donnie Moore
ALCS Game 5 - October 12, 1986
Dave Henderson 9th inning homerun off Moore to give Boston a 6-5 lead

SITUATION: Considering what really matters, this one is the most tragic of them all. Needing one strike to send the Angels to the World Series, Moore gave up a two run shot to Henderson in the 9th and Boston took a 6-5 lead. The Angels actually tied the game in the 9th but eventually lost in 11 and then proceeded to lose the next two games and the pennant as well. Lost in all of this is the fact that the Angels entered the 9th with a 3 run lead, but Mike Witt and Gary Lucas could not close the door. Only the Henderson run was charged to Moore with the other three assigned to Witt and Lucas. But the media, fans, and history only remember Moore, the closer, giving up the homerun with a 2-strike count.

RESULT: Moore pitched a scoreless 9th in the decisive game seven when his team was down 8-1. He pitched two more years in the majors following 1986 and totaled 41 appearances, a 4.13 ERA and nine saves in ‘87 and ‘88. Moore constantly commented how he would always be remembered for only one pitch, and that was his legacy. This led to his retirement, a struggle with depression, and, ultimately, his suicide in 1989.

Dennis Eckersley
World Series Game 1 - October 15, 1988
Kirk Gibson 9th inning game-winning homerun

SITUATION: No description really needed. One of the best closers in baseball. MVP of the league with two hurt legs. Dodgers down two in the ninth with two outs. Vin Scully says “you want to talk about a roll of the dice.” The fist pump. Again with Scully, “I don’t believe what I just saw!”
The heavy underdog Dodgers rode that momentum to a World Series title in five games. That home run is not hit, who knows what happens?

RESULT: He pitched one more inning that series, a scoreless ninth when his team was down in game 4. All Eckersley would do after this game is save 326 more regular season games, dominating for seven or eight seasons including the amazing 1990 where he had 48 saves and a 0.61 ERA. 1988 was only his second year closing, and this little setback does not seem to have affected him at all. Although, while Eckersley would have continued success in the playoffs (7 saves), he curiously gave up another walk-off hit in game 2 of the 1990 World Series against the Giants, a year where he was literally unhittable. In that tenth inning of game 2, he gave up back to back to back hits after only one third of an inning. He had only given up 41 hits in 74 innings the whole year.

Rick Aguilera
World Series Game 3 - October 22, 1991
Mark Lemke drives in David Justice in the 12th for the walk-off win

SITUATION: With the bases loaded and two outs in the top of the 12th, Rick Aguilera is, for some unknown reason, called in to pinch hit. He, of course, fails, and is then asked to pitch in the bottom of the inning. After a single and stolen base, Mark Lemke drives in Justice with a walk-off single. Aguilera saved the first two games of this classic series and was asked to hold the third, but could not do it. A win here would have given the Twins a commanding 3-0 lead, but instead the Braves won three straight games. Aguilera actually got the win in game 6, pitching two scoreless innings before Puckett hit his famous walk-off homerun. And we all know about Jack Morris’ epic game the next night. The Twins coming back and winning this series saved Aguilera from all the second guessing and interrogation that would have resulted had the Braves won that series.

RESULT: As we saw, he pitched very effectively only a couple of nights later in game 6 with no lingering affects. Also in only his second year as a closer, Aguilera would go on to save 237 more games, while only having an ERA over 4.00 once in the next nine years. Strangely, though, Aguilera only made it to the post-season one more time in his career, 1995, where he had a 13.50 ERA - and only pitched two-thirds of an inning.

Mitch Williams
World Series Game 6 - October 23, 1993
Joe Carter’s walk-off homerun to win the World Series off the Wild Thing

SITUATION: With a one-run lead going into the ninth, the Phillies were about to force a game seven when Mitch Williams imploded and gave up a walk, single and then a homerun to give the Blue Jays the title. Williams had already been up and down in the series, pitching 1.2 hitless innings for a save in game 2, but then giving up three runs in two-thirds of the eighth inning in game 4 to take the loss in a crazy 15-14 game. That set the stage for game 6 and Joe Carter’s ridiculous hops around the bases.

RESULT: He wasn’t called the “Wild Thing” for nothing. Williams had 186 saves in his career up through 1993 and was wildly effective, posting ERAs of anywhere from 2.34 to 4.63. After that World Series, however, his career was effectively over. While still only 28 at the time of that walk-off, he was out of baseball for good by age 32. He saved only six more games after that World Series loss and had ERAs of 7.65, 6.75 and 10.80 before he left for good. The ‘93 series essentially ended his career; he was immediately traded to the Astros who dropped him before the next season was two months old.

Mariano Rivera
World Series Game 7 - November 4, 2001
Luis Gonzalez hits a bloop single to win the World Series

SITUATION: The unhittable, unbeatable Mariano Rivera had already pitched the eighth where he struck out three men to preserve a 2-1 Yankee lead. By the time the ninth inning came around, Rivera had given up only one run in 15 innings in the 2001 postseason. Three more outs and the Yankees have won four Series in a row. But things started to unravel. Mark Grace singled. Damian Miller tries to sacrifice him, and Rivera makes a throwing error, putting men at first and second. Another sacrifice by Jay Bell does not work, with the lead runner being retired. Men on first and second with one out. Then it really gets ugly. Tony Womack doubles, bringing in one. Craig Counsell is hit by a pitch to load the bases. And Luis Gonzalez steps to the plate with the infield drawn in….There is a book written about this game: “The Last Night of the Yankee Dynasty” by Buster Olney.

RESULT: After a good but not stellar 2002, Rivera has gone on to have four of the most dominating seasons a closer has ever had including being the runner-up to the Cy Young in 2004 and 2005. His career postseason ERA is 0.81 with an 8-1 record and 34 saves. Any remains from the 2001 series with the Diamondbacks have been eliminated in his mind, as far as I’m concerned. He is the greatest closer of our time.

Brad Lidge
NLCS Game 5 - October 17, 2005
Albert Pujols homers off Lidge to send the series back to St. Louis

SITUATION: In hindsight, Lidge had pitched four innings over the previous three games, saving them all, so bringing him in for a fourth straight day may not have been the best idea, even with a 4-2 lead. Nonetheless, Lidge struck out the first two batters before Eckstein beat out a single, Edmonds walked, and Pujols stepped up to the plate. Here was one fan’s reaction after the game: “When I saw him hit that homerun, and how high and fast it was leaving the ballpark, I half-expected it to shatter a light stand and rain sparks down on the field.” Fortunately for the Astros, they won in St. Louis to clinch the series in six games. Lidge did not appear in that game.

RESULT: Immediately after this series, Lidge pitched in three of the four World Series games, losing two of them and not factoring in the other. He gave up a walk-off homerun to Scott Podsednik in game two (who had not had a HR all season), and an 8th inning RBI single to Jermaine Dye for the only run in the decisive game. The following year, 2006, Lidge struggled mightily and was removed from the closer role three times. His 2006 numbers included five losses, six blown saves, and a 5.28 ERA. A lot of people say his luck was bad as he had 104 Ks in 75 innings and a League Adjusted ERA of only 4.54, but he clearly was not the same. Through two games of 2007, his ERA was 16.20 and he was removed from the closer’s role yet again.

So there you have it. Six devastating losses by six established closers. While the sample size is small, you can see that a devastating walk-off or loss does not necessarily mean a breakdown in subsequent years. In our study, three went on to have great success while three went on to break down after their respective game.

This leads me to believe that any problems are not the result of mechanical or physical flaws. There is also not a consistency between pitchers who had to go out and pitch right away vs. pitchers who had an offseason to think about their shortcomings. There is also no consistency between pitchers who had been closing games for two years or less vs. pitchers who had been establish major league firemen. Further still, there is no consistency between pitchers whose teams ended up winning the series vs. the teams that did not.

Unfortunately, we can not measure or quantify a pitcher’s psyche or fortitude, but any problems may lie there. Which makes any similar future situation almost impossible to predict.

Much of the information used here was from Retrosheet and Baseball Reference.